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I. INTRODUCTION
Gender inequality has a long and pervasive history in both the United States
and India. Not surprisingly, the Constitutions of both countries guarantee
equality before the law: India's Constitution explicitly mandates equality for
women, whereas the U.S. Constitution guarantees equal protection of the law
without any explicit designation of the intended beneficiaries. American
scholars, and particularly feminists, are increasingly studying India to assess
whether and how the world's largest democracy, a democracy grounded in
patriarchy, is making good on its promise of equality to women. We have
much to learn by looking at India's experience despite the vast cultural
differences between the two countries. Most notable is India's commitment
to affirmative action and protective discrimination to alleviate centuries of
exclusion of women from politics, education, and public employment.
This Article will explore how the respective equality guarantees have been
interpreted and applied to issues of gender justice by the Supreme Court of
India and by the U.S. Supreme Court. After a brief review of the historic and
current gender inequalities in the two countries, Parts H1 & Ill of the Article
examine the theories of equality reflected in the decisions of the two Courts.
The U.S. Supreme Court adheres rigidly to a model of formal equality which
requires that all persons similarly situated be treated the same.' Thus, to the
extent that there are relevant differences between women and men, formal
equality does not require equal treatment.2 The Supreme Court of India relies
on formal equality theory but, because the Constitution of India authorizes
"special" provisions for women and other historically disenfranchised groups,3
' See, e.g., Tuan Anh Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53, 63 (2001); see also infra notes 26-30
and accompanying text.
2 See, for example, Michael M. v. Super. Ct. of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464,469 (198 1),
where the Court stated:
[T]he Equal Protection Clause does not "demand that a statute necessarily
apply equally to all persons" or require " 'things which are different in
fact ... to be treated in law as though they were the same.' ". .. [Tihis Court
has consistently upheld statutes where the gender classification is not
invidious, but rather realistically reflects the fact that the sexes are not
similarly situated in certain circumstances (internal citations omitted).
3 See, for example, Article 15(3) of the Constitution of India, which authorizes the State to
make "special provision for women and children"; Article 15(4), which authorizes the State to
make "special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes
of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes"; Article 16(4), which
authorizes provisions "for the reservation of appointments or posts in favour of any backward
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the Court frequently has been willing to embrace a model of substantive
equality. Substantive equality represents a very different theory of equality-a
theory that is less concerned with treating alikes the same and more concerned
with recognizing differences between men and women and ameliorating the
unequal consequences of those differences.4
Part IV of the Article contrasts the two Courts' willingness to rely on
principles of international law and to engage in judicial activism, particularly
with respect to issues of gender violence. Here is where the contrast between
the two approaches is the most dramatic. The U.S. Supreme Court has been
unwilling to look to the experience of other countries or to rely on principles
of international law, most notably the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW),5 when confronted with
problems of violence against women.6 The Supreme Court of India, relying on
international law, has approached the problem of gender violence as an
equality issue, finding that freedom from gender violence is a fundamental
constitutional right.7
Finally, Part V analyzes the extent to which the competing theories of
equality reflect and adequately address different cultural conditions within the
two countries. In assessing whether either Court has played a meaningful role
in advancing the guarantee of equality for its nation's women, the Article
concludes that formal equality, standing alone, is insufficient to accomplish
meaningful change; that a protectionist approach is a double-edged sword that
recognizes and compensates for women's subordinated status, but also
promotes and perpetuates that vulnerability; and that substantive equality
class of citizens which, in the opinion of the State, is not adequately represented in the services
under the State." INDIA CONST. arts. 15 and 16. For an explanation of the roles that preferences
and protective discrimination play in India's constitutional democracy, see T.M.A. Pai Found.
v. Karnataka, (2002) 8 S.C.C. 481.
' Substantive equality has been defined as being "directed at eliminating individual,
institutional and systemic discrimination against disadvantaged groups which effectively
undermines their full and equal social, economic, political, and cultural participation in society."
RATNA KAPUR & BRENDA COSSMAN, SUBVERSIVE SITES: FEMINIST ENGAGEMENTS WITH LAW
IN INDIA 176 (1996); see also infra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
' Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18,
1979, 108 Stat. 1796, 1249 U.N.T.S. 513 [hereinafter CEDAW].
6 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); see also infra notes 278-301
and accompanying text.
' See, e.g., Chairman, Ry. Bd. v. Das, A.I.R. 2000 S.C. 988; Apparel Exp. Promotion
Council v. Chopra, A.I.R. 1999 S.C. 625; Vishaka v. Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 3011; see also
infra notes 302-32 and accompanying text.
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offers the best hope for facilitating women's full and equal participation in
society.
India and the United States share a long history of pervasive discrimination
against women. In both countries, women were denied the right to vote: in the
United States until 1920 when the Nineteenth Amendment was ratified, and in
India until 1950 when the Constitution was enacted! Politically, women
remain grossly underrepresented in both countries. Women comprise only
14% of the U.S. Congress9 and 22.5% of the state legislatures.1" In India,
women comprise 9% of the Indian Parliament1" and are even more
underrepresented in the state legislatures.1 2 In the United States, a woman has
never served as president or vice president; 3 in India, Indira Gandhi served as
Prime Minister for fifteen years.
14
8 U.S. CONST. amend. XIX; INDIA CONST. art. 325.
9 U.N. Dev. Programme, Human Development Report: Deepening Democracy in a
Fragmented World 16 (2002), http://www.undp.org/reports/global/2002/en/pdf/chpaterone.pdf;
see also Adam Clymer, In 2002, Woman's Place May Be the Statehouse, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 15,
2002, at 1.
10 National Conference of State Legislatures, http://www.ncsl.org.
" U.N. Dev. Programme, Human Development Report Millenium Development Goals: A
Compact among Nations to End Human Poverty (2003), available at http://www.undp.org/
reports/global/2003/pdf/hdrO3_complete.pdf; see also Martha C. Nussbaum, India: Implementing
Sex Equality Through Law, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 35, 35 (2001).
12 WOMEN& POLITICALEMPOWERMENT 12(1998) (reprinted data reported by the Centre for
the Study of Developing Societies). India's Constitution was amended in 1993 to mandate the
reservation of seats for women on panchayats, which are units of local self-governance, and one
million women now serve on the panchayats. A constitutional amendment to reserve one-third
of all seats in Parliament and the state legislatures for women has been debated since 1996.
Louise Harmon & Eileen Kaufman, Dazzling the World. A Study of India's Constitutional
Amendment Mandating Reservations for Women on Rural Panchayats, 19 BERKELEY WOMEN'S
L.J. 32, 54-55 (2004).
"3 In a poll conducted for the White House Project, 79% of those surveyed said that they
were willing to vote for a woman for president. Press Release, The White House Project, New
Poll Finds Nearly Eighty Percent of Americans Are Ready for a Woman President, Sept. 12,
2005, http://www.thewhitehouseproject.org/v2/press/2005/Press%20Releases/roperpoll.html.
"4 Indira Gandhi served as India's Prime Minister from 1966 to 1977 and from 1980 to 1984
when she was assassinated. Her political power derived from her father, India's first Prime
Minister Jawaharlal Nehru,just as Sonia Gandhi's current position of leadership of the Congress
Party is linked to her husband, Rajiv Gandhi, who served as Prime Minister from 1984 to 1989.
Indira Gandhi, http://womenshistory.about.com/od/gandhiindira/index.htm (last visited Mar. 6,
2006).
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Women are also markedly underrepresented on the Supreme Courts of both
countries. The first female U.S. Supreme Court Justice was not appointed until
1981, joined by a second in 1993.'5 The first woman was appointed to the
Supreme. Court of India a full forty years after Independence, and typically
only one of the twenty-six Justices is female."1 In the United States, women
comprise 22.8% of the federal judiciary 7 and 23.75% of the state appellate
judiciary."5 In India, a shockingly low 2.4% of all judges on the High Courts
are women.19
Economically, the picture in the United States remains bleak. For the year
2002, the estimated earned income of women averaged $27,338 per year,
contrasted with an estimated $43,797 for men.20 Thus, on average, women are
earning 62% of what men earn.21 In the same year, 5.2% of the top wage
earners in the United States were women, up from a mere 1.2% in 1995. In
" Justice Sandra Day O'Connor was appointed in 1981; Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg was
appointed in 1993. Justice O'Connor announced her retirement on July 1,2005. Supreme Court
of the United States, The Justices of the Supreme Court, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/
biographiescurrent.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2006).
16 See Nussbaum, supra note 11, at 37; see also Indira Jaising, Gender Justice and the
Supreme Court, in SUPREME BUT NOT INFALLIBLE: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF THE SUPREME COURT
OF INDIA, 291-92 (B.N. Kirpal eds. et al., 2000). Article 124 of the Indian Constitution gives the
President the power to make judicial appointments after consultation with judges of the Supreme
Court and the High Courts. INDIA CONST. art. 124. Until 1993, the appointment process was
controlled by the Executive. As a result of Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Ass 'n v. Union
oflndia, (1993) 4 S.C.C. 44 1, however, the power shifted to the judiciary, and since then it has
basically been a system of judges appointing judges, based in large part on seniority. Since
women have traditionally been underrepresented in the judiciary, this system serves to insure that
women will not be fully represented in the High Courts and in the Supreme Court of India.
Jaising, supra, at 291.
17 Alliance for Justice, Demographic Overview of the Federal Judiciary, http://www.afj.org/
judicial/judiciaLselection-resources/selection-databasebyCourtRaceGender.asp (last visited
Jan. 17, 2006).
18 Three hundred and nineteen of the 1343 judges on courts of last resort and intermediate
appellate courts are women. See National Center for State Courts, Women Justices Serving on
State Courts ofLast Resort andlntermediate Appellate Courts, 2002, http://www.ncsonline.org/
wc/FAQs/JuoRo/FAQ.htm; see also Chris W. Bonneau, The Composition of State Supreme
Courts, 2000, 85 JUDICATURE 26, 28 (2001) (representing that the percentage of women judges
on state supreme courts increased from 3.1% in 1980-1981 to 25.8% in 2000).
19 CJ for More Women Judges, TRIBUNE, Dec. 7, 2000, available at http://www.
tribuneindia.com/2000/20001208/nation.htm.
20 U.N. Dev. Programme, Human Development Report 2004: Cultural Liberty in Today's
Diverse World 217 (2004), http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2004/pdf/hdr04-complete.pdf
[hereinafter HDR: Cultural Liberty].
21 Id.
[Vol. 34:557
WOMEN AND LAW
2005, less than 2% of Fortune 500 and Fortune 1000 companies were run by
women. 22
As bleak as the economic numbers for American women are, the picture is
far worse for Indian women, who earn an average of $1,442 per year compared
to an average $3,820 for men.23 This means that Indian women's earnings are
only 38% of their male counterparts' earnings. 24 On the international gender-
related development index, India ranked 127 out of 177 countries.
25
These profound gender inequities provide the backdrop for evaluating the
role of the courts in interpreting the constitutional guarantee of equality.
II. GENDER DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT
The U.S. Constitution contains no explicit equality guarantee for women.26
In fact, women are alluded to only once in the document; the Nineteenth
Amendment, ratified in 1920, explicitly provides that the right to vote shall not
be abridged on the basis of sex.27 The equality guarantee finds expression in
the Fourteenth Amendment, which, while not explicitly referring to sex
discrimination, prohibits the states from denying to any person the "equal
protection of the laws. 28
The Supreme Court's approach to claims of gender discrimination is
grounded in a theory of formal equality. This approach to equality requires
that all persons similarly situated be treated the same. Thus, to the extent that
there are relevant differences, formal equality does not require equal treatment.
Although the Court never has wavered from its commitment to formal equality,
22 In 2005, there were nine women CEOs in Fortune 500 companies and nineteen in Fortune
1000 companies. Women CEOs ofFortune 500 Companies, FORTUNE, Apr. 18, 2005, available
at http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500/womenceos/.
23 HDR: Cultural Liberty, supra note 20, at 219. For a description of the current realities
facing Indian women, see Harmon & Kaufman, supra note 12, at 45-57; see also Aradhana
Parmar, Women and the Law, LAW, POLITICS AND SOCIETY IN INDIA (1990).
24 HDR: Cultural Liberty, supra note 20, at 219.
25 Id. at 219-20.
26 See Martha Craig Daughtrey, Women and the Constitution: Where We Are at the End of
the Century, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 4 (2000).
27 U.S. CONST. amend. XIX provides: "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex."
28 Id. amend. XIV. Although there is no equal protection clause that operates against the
federal government, the equal protection guarantee has essentially been read into the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which is applicable to the federal government. Bolling
v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
2006]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
it has shifted from an approach that was quick to recognize differences
between men and women 29 to one that deliberately rejects assumptions about
differences, even when those assumptions reflect an underlying reality.3"
In the first century after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in
1868, the Court assumed the role of benevolent "protector"'" of women,
upholding gender classifications on the basis of differences between men and
women and the need for the law to protect women. In case after case, between
1868 and 1971, the Court upheld gender classifications on the ground that
women required special protection given their delicate nature and child-rearing
function.3 2 The theme that emerges from these cases is legally-sanctioned
protection of women, expressed as a benign preference for women and a
judicial solicitude for the moral and physical well-being of women.
Thus, for example, in Bradwell v. Illinois,3 3 the Court upheld Illinois' ban
on women practicing law, with Justice Bradley declaring, in an oft-quoted
concurring opinion, that:
Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. The
natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the
female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil
life....
The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil the
noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of
the Creator.34
29 See infra notes 31-48 and accompanying text.
30 See infra notes 49-129 and accompanying text.
31 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973).
32 See Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (supporting exemption for women serving as
jurors); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (sanctioning limitation on women serving as
bartenders); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (allowing prohibition on women working
more than ten hours per day); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1872) (upholding ban on women
practicing law).
" Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 130.
14 Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring). Justice Bradley found that admitting a married woman
to practice as a lawyer would be "contrary to the rule of the common law and the usages of
Westminster Hall from time immemorial." Id. at 140. He further explained that pursuant to the
common law:
[A] woman had no legal existence separate from her husband, who was
regarded as her head and representative in the social state; and,
notwithstanding some recent modifications of this civil status, many of the
special rules of law flowing from and dependent upon this cardinal principle
still exist in full force in most States. One of these is, that a married woman
564 [Vol. 34:557
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Similarly, in Muller v. Oregon,35 the Court upheld an Oregon statute that
prohibited the employment of women in a factory or laundry for more than ten
hours per day.36 Once again, thejustification for this gender classification was
women's dependent status-her weak physical structure and maternal
function:
That woman's physical structure and the performance of
maternal functions place her at a disadvantage in the struggle for
subsistence is obvious....
Differentiated by these matters from the other sex, she is
properly placed in a class by herself, and legislation designed for
her protection may be sustained, even when like legislation is not
necessary for men and could not be sustained.37
Muller is a particularly significant case because the classification was upheld
during the Lochner era (from the late nineteenth century until 193 7), when the
Court was striking down a whole host of labor laws, including minimum wage
and maximum hour laws, on the ground that they constituted an interference
with liberty of contract.38 Indeed, even when the Lochner era ended, states did
not extend laws limiting women's working hours to men, which operated to
deny women access to a variety ofjob opportunities.39
Another case in this category of "benign preference" for women is
Goesaert v. Cleary,4° where the Court upheld a Michigan law that prohibited
women from working as bartenders unless they were wives or daughters of
male tavern owners.4 The Court had no trouble accepting the proposition that
a state can prohibit all women from working in a bar in order to protect their
is incapable, without her husband's consent, of making contracts which shall
be binding on her or him.
Id. at 141.
'5 Muller, 208 U.S. at 412.
36 Id. at 423.
17 Id. at 421-22.
"8 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Lochner involved a challenge to a New York
State statute prohibiting employers from allowing bakery employees to work more than ten hours
per day. The Court struck down the statute, finding that it interfered with a constitutional right
to contract. Id. at 64.
39 HERMA HILL KAY & MARTHA S. WEST, SEX-BASED DISCRIMINATION 17 (5th ed. 2002)
(citing JUDITH A. BAER, THE CHAINS OF PROTECTION (1978)).
40 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
41 Id. at 467.
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moral and physical well-being.42 The limited exception for wives and
daughters of bar owners was a rational exception, given the protection that
fathers and husbands offered.43
During this era, classifications were evaluated using mere rational basis
review, which requires only that the classification bear a rational relationship
to a legitimate governmental objective. Thus, in Goesaert, the Court stated
that equal protection "precludes irrational discrimination as between persons
or groups of persons in the incidence of a law. But the Constitution does not
require situations 'which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as
though they were the same.' "' The Court concluded "[s]ince the line [the
legislature has] drawn is not without a basis in reason, we cannot give ear to
the suggestion that the real impulse behind this legislation was an unchivalrous
desire of male bartenders to try to monopolize the calling. '
As recently as 1961, in Hoyt v. Florida,46 the Court upheld differential
treatment of men and women for jury service, mandating service by men, but
permitting service by women. 47  The Court explained, "[d]espite the
enlightened emancipation of women from the restrictions and protections of
bygone years, and their entry into many parts of community life formerly
considered to be reserved to men, woman is still regarded as the center of
home and family life."48
Thus, in the hundred years following the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment, every gender classification challenged under the Equal Protection
Clause was upheld. Laws treating men and women differently were repeatedly
validated based on the need to protect women from the harshness of the world,
including the dangers of taverns, the harms associated with long working
hours, the demands of jury service, and the ugliness of the courtroom. Given
inherent, divinely-ordained differences, the two sexes could be treated
differently in law, consistent with the equality principle, which only requires
that alikes be treated the same. Since women and men are not the same, the
equality principle does not require that they be treated the same. Thus, a
42 Id. at 466.
43 Id.
4 Id. (citing Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940)).
43 Id. at 467.
46 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
41 Id. at 69. This decision was effectively overruled by Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522
(1975).
48 Hoyt, 368 U.S. at 61-62.
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theory of formal equality, which requires treating equals alike, was used to
justify this jurisprudence of difference.
The era of protection ended in 1971 with Reed v. Reed,4 9 widely considered
to signify the breakdown of the Court's two-tier approach to equal protection.
Prior to this time, only two tests were used to analyze equal protection
challenges: the rational basis test and the strict scrutiny test. Strict scrutiny
was reserved for cases involving a suspect class, such as race or national
origin, and cases involving the denial of a fundamental right.5" In order to
withstand strict scrutiny, the government had to demonstrate that the
classification was necessary to achieve a compelling governmental interest.5
All other cases, including gender classifications, were evaluated pursuant to
the rational basis test. Pursuant to this test, legislation is presumed to be valid
and will be sustained if the classification is rationally related to a legitimate
government interest." Reed, however, raised the possibility that the Court was
willing to subject gender classifications to a form of scrutiny less deferential
than rational basis review.
Reed involved a challenge to an Idaho statute that compelled an automatic
preference to males regarding the administration of estates.53 Whenever
competing petitions were filed by a man and woman in the same entitlement
class, state law required appointing the male. Richard Reed's parents had
separated and Richard's mother had custody. While visiting his father,
Richard took one of his father's guns and used it to commit suicide. Both the
mother and father petitioned to administer his estate and, based on the statute,
the father was chosen.54
In a surprising decision, the Court in Reed struck down the statute,
purporting to apply the rational basis test. Rational basis requires that the
classification be reasonably related to a legitimate purpose. The purpose of
49 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
"O See, e.g., Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005) (finding that strict scrutiny is the
proper standard of review for a racial segregation claim); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306
(2003) (holding that racial classifications must survive strict scrutiny).
5' Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333.
52 See, e.g., F.C.C. v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993) [hereinafter Beach
Commc'ns], where the Court made clear that social and economic classifications subject to
rational basis review "must be upheld... if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that
could provide a rational basis for the classification."
13 Reed, 404 U.S. at 71.
14 Id. at 71-72. For a comparable case decided by the Supreme Court of India, see infra
notes 192-95 and accompanying text (discussing Hariharan v. Reserve Bank, A.I.R. 1999 S.C.
1149).
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Idaho's automatic preference for males was reducing the workload of the
probate courts, certainly a legitimate governmental interest. The Court,
however, concluded that the sex classification was arbitrary and not reasonably
related to the state objective. Had the statute said "when there are two people
in a category who are equally qualified, one will be chosen by random
selection," that presumably would have been upheld. The use of gender as a
proxy for competence, however, was impermissible."
Although the decision in Reed utilized rational basis language, it was a far
less deferential version of the test, which more typically operates as an "any
conceivable basis" test.56 Thus, Reed suggested that some form of heightened
scrutiny may be accorded claims of sex discrimination.
Two years later, in Frontiero v. Richardson,57 a plurality of the Court
applied strict scrutiny to a sex classification challenged pursuant to the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.5" Federal law provided housing and
medical benefits to wives of servicemen but denied such benefits to husbands
of servicewomen absent proof of dependency. The plurality in Frontiero
justified its use of strict scrutiny by concluding that sex, like race, is a suspect
classification because women historically have suffered pervasive
discrimination, because sex is an immutable characteristic, and because sex
59
55 To give a mandatory preference to members of either sex over members of
the other, merely to accomplish the elimination of hearings on the merits, is
to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and whatever may be said
as to the positive values of avoiding intrafamily controversy, the choice in this
context may not lawfully be mandated solely on the basis of sex.
Reed, 404 U.S. at 76-77.
56 See, for example, Beach Communc'ns, 508 U.S. at 315, where the Court explained that:
[I]t is entirely irrelevant for constitutional purposes whether a conceived
reason for the challenged distinction actually motivated the legislature... In
other words, a legislative choice is not subject to courtroom factfinding and
may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical
data... "Only by faithful adherence to this guiding principle of judicial
review of legislation is it possible to preserve to the legislative branch its
rightful independence and its ability to function."
(internal citations omitted).
7 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
58 The Court has held that the equal protection guarantee applies to the federal government
through the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497
(1954).
" The Court does not generally distinguish between the terms "sex" and "gender," although
since Frontiero was decided, the Court more often refers to gender discrimination than sex
discrimination. See, e.g., Tuan Anh Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53 (2001); J.E.B. v. Alabama,
[Vol. 34:557
WOMEN AND LAW
bears no relationship to fitness. Further, the plurality pointed to Congress'
recognition that sex discrimination is inherently invidious, as evidenced by the
enactment of the Equal Pay Act of 1963 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.60 While women are not a discrete and insular minority, women are
nevertheless underrepresented in politics as if they were a minority.6'
In defense of its policy in Frontiero, the government argued administrative
convenience, explaining that it was cheaper and easier to conclusively presume
511 U.S. 127 (1994); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982); Michael M. v.
Super. Ct. of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464 (1981); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976);
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975). At times, the Court uses "sex" and "gender"
interchangeably within the same decision. See, e.g., Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538
U.S. 721 (2003); Davis v. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999); Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420
(1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998). According to Mary Anne Case,
Justice Ginsburg is responsible for the interchangeable use of "sex" and "gender":
[S]he stopped talking about sex discrimination years ago . . . She
explained that a secretary once told her, "I'm typing all these briefs and
articles for you and the word sex, sex, sex, is on every page. Don't you know
those nine men [on the Supreme Court], they hear that word and their first
association is not the way you want them to be thinking? Why don't you use
the word 'gender'? It is a grammatical term and it will ward off distracting
associations."
Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Genderfrom Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate
Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 10 (1995) (citing Ernie Freda,
Washington in Brief: Clinton's Old Underwear Full of Tax Holes, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Dec. 29,
1993, at A8). Justice Scalia, writing in dissent in JE.B., noted the Court's use of the word
gender, stating:
Throughout this opinion, I shall refer to the issue as sex discrimination
rather than (as the Court does) gender discrimination. The word "gender" has
acquired the new and useful connotation of cultural or attitudinal
characteristics (as opposed to physical characteristics) distinctive to the sexes.
That is to say, gender is to sex as feminine is to female and masculine to male.
The present case does not involve peremptory strikes exercised on the basis
of femininity or masculinity (as far as it appears, effeminate men did not
survive the prosecution's peremptories). The case involves, therefore, sex
discrimination plain and simple.
J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 157 n. 1. In feminist theory, gender has been used to connote, not femininity
or masculinity as used by Justice Scalia, but rather the social construct of sex-the myriad ways
that the sexes are acculturated as male or female, although in recent years the dualistic approach
to sex and gender has itself been called into question. Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake
of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1
(1995) (faulting the dualistic approach to sex and gender and arguing that the law should
recognize the primacy of gender-based norms).
60 Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 687.
61 Id. at 686 n. 17; see also supra notes 9-19 and accompanying text.
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that wives are financially dependent on their husbands because that is
frequently the case. Significantly, the Court rejected that rationale, finding
that administrative convenience is not a sufficient justification for a sex
classification.62 Further, the government's explanation did not withstand
heightened scrutiny. First, it was not clear that the presumption would save
money because many wives might not actually be financially dependent on
their husbands.63 Second, individualized determinations of dependency would
not be too costly or burdensome because the determination could be made on
the basis of affidavits, which was the process used whenever a claim was made
on behalf of a husband of a servicewoman.'
The Court in Frontiero struck down the gender classification, relying on the
Reed rationale that "any statutory scheme which draws a sharp line between
the sexes, solely for the purpose of achieving administrative convenience,
necessarily commands 'dissimilar treatment for men and women who are...
similarly situated,' and therefore involves the 'very kind of arbitrary legislative
choice forbidden by the [Constitution].' "65 Thus, requiring servicewomen to
prove the dependency of their husbands while not imposing a similar
requirement on servicemen, solely to achieve administrative convenience,
violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.66
Without resolving the question of whether sex classifications trigger strict
scrutiny, the Court in Stanton v. Stanton,67 struck down a Utah statute that
obligated parents to support their sons until age twenty-one, but their daughters
only until age eighteen. 6' The Court relied on Reed, and found the
classification irrational and based on "old notions' 69 ofthe differences between
men and women:
No longer is the female destined solely for the home and the
rearing of the family, and only the male for the marketplace and
the world of ideas. Women's activities and responsibilities are
increasing and expanding. Coeducation is a fact, not a rarity.
62 Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 690.
63 Id. at 689.
6 Id. at 690.
65 Id.; see also Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975), where the Court struck down
a similar gender-based classification contained in the Social Security Act.
66 Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 690.
67 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
68 Id. at 14.
69 Id.
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The presence of women in business, in the professions, in
government and, indeed, in all walks of life where education is
a desirable, if not always a necessary, antecedent is apparent and
a proper subject ofjudicial notice. If a specified age of minority
is required for the boy in order to assure him parental support
while he attains his education and training, so, too, is it for the
girl. To distinguish between the two on educational grounds is
to be self-serving: if the female is not to be supported so long as
the male, she hardly can be expected to attend school as long as
he does, and bringing her education to an end earlier coincides
with the role-typing society has long imposed.7"
Ultimately in 1976, in Craig v. Boren,7 a majority of the Court
acknowledged a middle, intermediate level of scrutiny as the governing test
whenever sex classifications are challenged under the Equal Protection Clause.
Classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and
must be substantially related to achieving those objectives. This landmark
ruling was announced, ironically, in a case challenging a classification that
disadvantaged men.72 The challenged statute in Craig prohibited the sale of
beer with a 3.2% alcoholic content to males under the age of twenty-one and
females under the age of eighteen. The government sought tojustify its policy
by pointing to traffic safety, certainly an important governmental interest. The
issue in Craig was thus whether such a gender deferential substantially
furthered the government's objective or whether it constituted a denial of equal
protection to males between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one.7 3
The statistical evidence introduced by the government showed that 2.2% of
men between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one were arrested for drunk
driving as compared to .18% of women in that age category; that more
seventeen to twenty-one year old men were killed or injured in traffic accidents
than women; and that men were more apt to drink and drive than women.74
The Court in Craig concluded that the statistical correlation was "unduly
70 Id. at 14-15 (internal citations omitted).
7' 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
72 See David Cole, Strategies of Difference: Litigating for Women's Rights in a Man's
World, 2 LAW & INEQ. 33 (1984) ("Male plaintiffs have dominated the short history of sex
discrimination law at the Supreme Court.").
73 Craig, 429 U.S. at 192.
74 Id. at 200-01.
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tenuous ' 75 and inadequate to prove that "sex represents a legitimate, accurate
proxy for the regulation of drinking and driving."76
Justice Rehnquist dissented in Craig, arguing against applying heightened
scrutiny to laws that disadvantage men because men share none of the
traditional indicia of a suspect class.77 Justice Rehnquist noted, but ultimately
rejected, the argument that any sex classification burdens women:
I am not unaware of the argument from time to time advanced,
that all discriminations between the sexes ultimately redound to
the detriment of females because they tend to reinforce "old
notions" restricting the roles and opportunities of women...
Seeing no assertion that it has special applicability to the
situation at hand, I believe it can be dismissed as an insubstantial
consideration.78
This "insubstantial consideration" is precisely, however, what gender
stereotypes do; every stereotype of male machismo is accompanied by a
corresponding stereotype of female passivity. The reciprocity of gender
stereotypes makes stereotypes about men equally harmful to women. The
stereotype that men are more apt to drink and drive carries a corresponding
stereotype that women are more apt to be responsible, which is tied to the
stereotype of the proverbial "good girl"-a stereotype that has far-reaching
consequences for women in the public and private domain.
In the quarter of a century since Craig, the Court repeatedly has invalidated
gender classifications, using mid-level scrutiny, on the ground that the
classification represents archaic stereotypes or overbroad generalizations about
men and women. Thus, for example, in Kirchberg v. Feenstra,79 the Court
struck down a state statute that automatically designated the husband as the
administrator ofjointly owned property; in Orr v. Orr,"° the Court invalidated
a state statute authorizing alimony for women but not for men; and in
Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,"1 the Court invalidated a statute
that excluded men from enrolling in the state nursing school.
" Id. at 202.
76 Id. at 204.
77 Id. at 219.
78 Id. at 220 n.2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
79 450 U.S. 455 (1981).
'0 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
"' 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
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Sex classifications have been upheld in only a handful of modem (post-
Craig) cases, with most addressing claims by fathers of non-marital children
that they were being treated less favorably than mothers,82 one dealing with the
exclusion of women from Selective Service requirements,83 one dealing with
a statutory rape law that only punished male offenders,84 and another with a
provision of the Social Security Act designed to compensate women for the
effects of past discrimination.85 The last two warrant some discussion.
In Michael M v. Superior Court of Sonoma County,86 a divided court
upheld California's statutory rape law criminalizing acts of sexual intercourse
with a female less than eighteen years of age. Pursuant to the statute, a man
who engages in sexual intercourse with an underage woman is subject to
criminal prosecution, but a woman who engages in sexual intercourse with an
underage man is not.87 The Court found that the classification substantially
furthered the important objective of preventing unwanted teenage pregnancy.88
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the plurality, reasoned that young women did not
need to be punished for engaging in sexual relations because the risk of
82 See Tuan Anh Nguyen v. 1.N.S., 533 U.S. 53 (2001), where a 5-4 majority upheld different
requirements for obtaining citizenship depending on whether a child was born to a citizen mother
or a citizen father; Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998), where the Court upheld the statutory
requirement that non-marital children born to citizen fathers but not citizen mothers must obtain
proof of paternity before the child reaches eighteen years of age; Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S.
347 (1979), where the Court upheld a statute preventing a father of a non-marital child whom
he has not "legitimized" from instituting a wrongful death suit.
83 In Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981), the Court upheld the Military Selective
Service Act provision mandating registration of men but not women. Under existing law and
policy at the time, women were excluded from combat service. The validity of that combat
exclusion was not challenged. The Court had little difficulty in concluding that "[m]en and
women, because of the combat restrictions on women, are simply not similarly situated for
purposes of a draft or registration for a draft." Id. at 78. Rostker is arguably sui generis because
the Court historically accords great deference to the government when reviewing military
classifications. "The case arises in the context of Congress' authority over national defense and
military affairs, and perhaps in no other area has the Court accorded Congress greater deference."
Id. at 64-65. "[J]udicial deference to such congressional exercise of authority is at its apogee
when legislative action under the congressional authority to raise and support armies and make
rules and regulations for their governance is challenged." Id. at 70.
84 Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
85 Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (upholding a provision of the Social Security
Act authorizing female workers to exclude additional low-earning years from the computation
of their average monthly wage).
86 Michael M, 450 U.S. at 464.
87 Id. at 466.
88 Id. at 473.
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pregnancy was itself the deterrent.8 9 Whether or not the legislature was also
concerned with protecting the "virtue and chastity of young women" was
irrelevant because an illicit motive alone, according to the plurality, does not
invalidate an otherwise constitutional classification. 90
The dissent in Michael M read the legislative history far differently:
[T]he historical development of [the statute] demonstrates that
the law was initially enacted on the premise that young women,
in contrast to young men, were to be deemed legally incapable of
consenting to an act of sexual intercourse. Because their chastity
was considered particularly precious, those young women were
felt to be uniquely in need of the State's protection. In contrast,
young men were assumed to be capable of making such decisions
for themselves; the law therefore did not offer them any special
protection.9
The dissent relied on earlier California Supreme Court decisions which leave
little doubt that the goal of the classification was to protect young women from
sexual activity.92
89 Id.
" Id. at 472 n.7 (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968)).
9' Id. at 495-96 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
9 Id. The Court cited People v. Verdegreen, 106 Cal. 211, 214-15 (1895), where the
California Supreme Court stated:
The obvious purpose of [the statutory rape law] is the protection of society by
protecting from violation the virtue of young and unsophisticated girls....
It is the insidious approach and vile tampering with their persons that
primarily undermines the virtue of young girls, and eventually destroys it; and
the prevention of this, as much as the principal act, must undoubtedly have
been the intent of the legislature.
Similarly, in People v. Hernandez, 61 Cal. 2d 529, 531 (1964), the California Supreme Court
stated:
[The under-age woman] is presumed too innocent and naive to understand the
implications and nature of her act.... The law's concern with her capacity
or lack thereof to so understand is explained in part by a popular conception
of the social, moral and personal values which are preserved by the abstinence
from sexual indulgence on the part of a young woman. An unwise disposition
of her sexual favor is deemed to do harm both to herself and the social mores
by which the community's conduct patterns are established. Hence the law
of statutory rape intervenes in an effort to avoid such a disposition.
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Califano v. Webster,93 in contrast, was a case where the governmental
objective was not to protect women from sexual activity or unwanted
pregnancy, but rather to compensate for past discrimination suffered by
women. This case involved a challenge to a provision of the Social Security
Act that permitted women to deduct more low income quarters of coverage
than men for purposes of calculating the monthly social security benefit.94
Califano is one of the few cases where the Court has been confronted with
a sex classification defended on the ground that it reduces "the disparity in
economic condition between men and women caused by the long history of
discrimination against women., 95 The Court upheld the sex classification,
finding that compensation for past discrimination is an important governmental
objective sufficient to withstand mid-level scrutiny:
The more favorable treatment of the female wage earner ... was
not a result of "archaic and overbroad generalizations" about
women ... such as casual assumptions that women are "the
weaker sex" or are more likely to be child-rearers or dependents.
Rather, "the only discernible purpose of [Section 215's more
favorable treatment is] the permissible one of redressing our
society's longstanding disparate treatment of women."96
In reaching this conclusion, the Court indicated that the mere recitation of
a benign purpose is not sufficient.97 Here, however, the claim of past
discrimination suffered by women in the workplace was based on substantiated
fact. "Whether from overt discrimination or from the socialization process of
a male-dominated culture, the job market is inhospitable to the woman seeking
any but the lowest paid jobs."98 Interestingly, even with the more favorable
treatment afforded by the Social Security Act, women still received lower
retirement benefits on average than men.99
9' 430 U.S. 313 (1977).94 Id. at 315-16.
9' Id. at 317.
96 Id. (internal citations omitted).
97 Id. (citing Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 (1975), where the Court
invalidated a provision of the Social Security Act that denied survivors' benefits to widowers
that were granted to widows).
98 Id. at 318 (citing Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 353 (1974)).
99 On average, women's monthly retirement benefit was $140.50; men's monthly retirement
benefit was $179.60. Id. at 318 n.5.
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The two most significant cases of the last decade for what they say about
gender differences are JE.B. v. Alabama"°0 and United States v. Virginia."°1
In J.E.B.,1°2 the Court ruled that peremptory challenges 3 exercised on the
basis of gender violate equal protection. The case involved a paternity
petition, with the putative father exercising his peremptory challenges to
exclude women from the jury, and the state, acting on behalf of the child,
exercising its peremptory challenges to exclude men from the jury. Since there
were more women than men in the jury pool, the resulting jury was
predominantly female and the jury returned a verdict finding that J.E.B. was
the father."°
The issue before the Court in J.E.B. was whether a party's use of
peremptory challenges in jury selection to exclude one sex substantially
furthers the state's objective of affording a fair and impartial trial. What
makes the case so interesting is the extent to which it implicates the issue of
gender differences. Do men and women perceive issues differently? Are men
and women likely to approach issues of paternity, of child support, of rape
from different vantage points? If the answer to those questions is yes, does
that necessarily mean that peremptories can reflect that underlying reality?
The majority of the Court in J.E.B. concluded that even if there are gender
differences in fact, they may not be recognized in law.
Writing for the majority in J.E.B., Justice Blackmun noted that even if there
is some truth to the stereotype, the use of peremptory challenges on the basis
of sex is tantamount to using sex as a proxy for bias, which is unlawful under
equal protection analysis.'0 5 Consistent with Washington v. Davis,"6 which
10 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
"' 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
102 J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 127.
103 A peremptory challenge is "[Olne of a party's limited number of challenges that do not
need to be supported by a reason unless the opposing party makes a prima facie showing that the
challenge was used to discriminate on the basis of race, ethnicity, or sex." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIoNARY 245 (8th ed. 2004).
'04 JE.B., 511 U.S. at 129.
105 Even if a measure of truth can be found in some of the gender stereotypes used to
justify gender-based peremptory challenges, that fact alone cannot support
discrimination on the basis of gender injury selection. We have made abundantly clear
in past cases that gender classifications that rest on impermissible stereotypes violate
the Equal Protection Clause, even when some statistical support can be conjured up for
the generalization.
Id. at 140 n.1l.
106 426 U.S. 229 (1976); see also infra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
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rejected disparate impact theory as a basis for an equal protection violation,
Justice Blackmun noted that if peremptories were exercised on the basis of a
characteristic disproportionately linked to gender, there would be no equal
protection violation.0 7 Thus, peremptories exercised against nurses or against
veterans would not violate equal protection absent proof of pretext.'
0 8
In a concurring opinion in J.E.B., Justice O'Connor expressed the view that
"like race, gender matters."' 9 She noted that studies make clear that women
are more likely to convict in rape cases than are men, and she intuits that in
cases involving sexual harassment, child custody, domestic violence, and child
abuse, "a person's gender and resulting life experience will be relevant to his
or her view of the case."'" 0 Nevertheless, she agreed with the majority that
gender can make no difference as a matter of constitutional law, despite its
difference as a matter of actual fact."'
Justice Rehnquist, writing in dissent in J.E.B., agreed that there is a
difference between men and women but concluded that equal protection is not
violated by recognizing that difference: "[t]he two sexes differ, both
biologically and, to a diminishing extent, in experience. It is not merely
' stereotyping' to say that these differences may produce a difference in outlook
which is brought to the jury room.""'
Justice Scalia's dissent in J.E.B. was based on his view that there is a
difference between a classification based on inferiority and a classification that
does not perpetuate disadvantage." 3 He further questioned who has been
107 "Even strikes based on characteristics that are disproportionately associated with one
gender could be appropriate, absent a showing of pretext." JE.B., 511 U.S. at 143.
'08 "For example, challenging all persons who have had military experience would
disproportionately affect men at this time, while challenging all persons employed as nurses
would disproportionately affect women. Without a showing of pretext, however, these
challenges may well not be unconstitutional, since they are not gender or race based." Id. at
n.16.
'o Id. at 148 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
11 Id. at 149.
1" "But to say that gender makes no difference as a matter of law is not to say that gender
makes no difference as a matter of fact." Id.
12 Id. at 156 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
113 To say that men were singled out for discriminatory treatment in this process
is preposterous. The situation would be different if both sides systematically
struck individuals of one group, so that the strikes evinced group-based
animus and served as a proxy for segregated venire lists. The pattern here,
however, displays not a systemic sex-based animus but each side's desire to
get a jury favorably disposed to its case. That is why the Court's
characterization of respondent's argument as "reminiscent of the arguments
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harmed by the use of peremptories because both sides exercised challenges
based on gender."
4
Perhaps the most significant analysis of how gender discrimination claims
should be analyzed under the Equal Protection Clause is found in United States
v. Virginia,"5 where the Court refused to permit gender differences to justify
the exclusion of women from the Virginia Military Institute. With Justice
Ginsberg writing for a 7-1 majority," 6 the Court concluded that equal
protection was violated and that the remedy relied on by Virginia, the creation
of Virginia Institute for Leadership at Mary Baldwin College (VWIL), was
insufficient to cure the violation." 
7
The case's significance lies in its exposition of mid-level scrutiny.
Intermediate scrutiny is understood as requiring that the classification
substantially further an important state interest. Additionally, the justification
must be genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc, and the burden is on
the government to show an exceedingly persuasive justification, which may
not be based on overbroad generalizations about the different talents,
capacities, or preferences of men and women. "8
advanced to justify the total exclusion of women from juries," is patently
false. Women were categorically excluded from juries because of doubt that
they were competent; women are stricken from juries by peremptory
challenge because of doubt that they are well disposed to the striking party's
case. There is discrimination and dishonor in the former, and not in the
latter-which explains the 106-year interlude between our holding that
exclusion from juries on the basis of race was unconstitutional, and our
holding that peremptory challenges on the basis of race were unconstitutional.
Id. at 160 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). In a sense, this is consistent with
Cass Sunstein's anti-caste principle. See Cass R. Sunstein, Affirmative Action, Caste, and
Cultural Comparisons, 97 MICH. L. REv. 1311 (1999). Yet, it is not a view that Justice Scalia
adheres to when analyzing affirmative action challenges. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
306 (2003).
,14 "This case is a perfect example of how the system as a whole is evenhanded. While the
only claim before the Court is petitioner's complaint that the prosecutor struck male jurors, for
every man struck by the government petitioner's own lawyer struck a woman." J.E.B., 511 U.S.
at 159-60 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
115 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
16 Justice Clarence Thomas did not participate because his son attended VMI.
117 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533.
118 To summarize the Court's current directions for cases of official classification
based on gender: Focusing on the differential treatment or denial of
opportunity for which relief is sought, the reviewing court must determine
whether the proffered justification is "exceedingly persuasive." The burden
ofjustification is demanding and it rests entirely on the State. The State must
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Virginia proffered two state objectives: first, that single sex education
contributes to diversity in educational opportunities; and second, that the
unique "adversative method"' 9 utilized in VMI would have to be sacrificed if
women were admitted. As to the first, the Court simply disbelieved that
diversity was the actual reason. 2 ' As to the second, the Court rejected the
argument that admitting women would destroy VMI's distinctive "adversative
method," characterizing it as the classic argument historically used to exclude
women from law, medicine, police forces, and military academies.' 2 '
The Court in Virginia emphasized that generalizations about women are
insufficient to justify gender classifications. While it may be true that few
women would be interested in attending VMI, the reality is that most men
would not be interested either and "[t]he issue.. . is not whether 'women-or
men-should be forced to attend VMI'; rather, [it is] whether the [state] can
constitutionally deny to women who have the will and capacity, the training
and attendant opportunities that VMI uniquely affords."' 22
The Court in Virginia further concluded that the all-women school that
Virginia had created was an insufficient remedy for the constitutional
violation, given the vast disparities between the two schools in student body,
faculty, course offerings, facilities, and prestige. 23 Virginia defended the
show "at least that the [challenged] classification serves 'important
governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed' are
'substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.' " The
justification must be genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc in
response to litigation. And it must not rely on overbroad generalizations
about the different talents, capacities, or preferences of males and females.
Id. at 532-33 (internal citations omitted).
"9 Id. at 520. This method is described as a doubting model of education featuring:
"physical rigor, mental stress, absolute equality of treatment, absence of
privacy, minute regulation of behavior, and indoctrination in desirable
values." As one Commandant of Cadets described it, the adversative method
"dissects the young student," and makes him aware of his "limits and
capabilities," so that he knows 'how far he can go with his anger, . . . how
much he can take under stress .... exactly what he can do when he is
physically exhausted.'
Id. at 522.
20 Id. at 536-39.
121 Id. at 542-46.
122 Id. at 542.
123 The two schools offered vastly different programs: VMI's program was designed to
produce "citizen soldiers" and offered a military training. Id. at 522. VWIL's program,
however, was designed to de-emphasize military training and instead offer a "cooperative
method" of education designed to foster self-esteem. Id. at 549. Beyond the programmatic
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programmatic differences on the basis that women and men learn in different
ways and that the program at VWIL reflected what was appropriate for most
women.'24 But, that was precisely the problem. The fact that a majority of
women might prefer a nurturing, cooperative environment over a strict,
militaristic one is insufficient to support the exclusion of women as a matter
of constitutional law. 125
The theory of equality reflected in all of the described U.S. Supreme Court
cases is formal equality. Persons similarly situated must be treated the same.
In deciding whether men and women are similarly situated, generalizations
about women's aptitudes, preferences, interests, or talents will be insufficient
even when the generalization reflects reality. That was true inJ.E.B.-the fact
that women may generally favor the petitioner in a paternity suit was
insufficient to support the use of peremptories to exclude them. 126 It was
equally true in Virginia-the fact that women may generally prefer the
program offered at VWIL was insufficient to support the exclusion of women
from VMI.
127
This version of formal equality is one that denies gender differences, in law
if not in fact. Justice Ginsburg, an early advocate for gender equality,
defended this approach in an essay where she explained that the strategy of
minimizing gender differences was necessary because those same differences
had been used for over a century to justify a host of discriminatory laws toward
women:
Some observers have portrayed the 1970s litigation as
assimilationist in outlook, insistent on formal equality, opening
doors only to comfortably situated women willing to accept
differences, VWIL was distinctly inferior to VMI in a number of respects: entrants scored 100
points lower on the SAT; faculty possessed fewer degrees and were paid less; fewer degree
programs were offered; the endowment was substantially less; the curriculum offered fewer
choices; and the alumni association and attendant employment opportunities were less extensive.
Id. at 551-55.
124 Virginia argued that "these methodological differences are 'justified pedagogically,' based
on 'important differences between men and women in learning and developmental needs,'
'psychological and sociological differences' Virginia describes as 'real' and 'not stereotypes.'"
Id. at 549.
125 The Court stated that "generalizations about 'the way women are,' estimates of what is
appropriate for most women, no longer justify denying opportunity to women whose talent and
capacity place them outside the average description." Id. at 550.
126 J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 127.
127 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 515.
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men's rules and be treated like men, even a misguided effort that
harmed more women than it helped.
Such comment seems to me not fair. The litigation of the
1970s helped unsettle previously accepted conceptions of men's
and women's separate spheres, and thereby added impetus to
efforts ongoing in the political arena to advance women's
opportunities and stature. An appeal to courts at that time could
not have been expected to do much more. 2 '
Ultimately, Justice Ginsburg pointed to the legislature as the future forum to
accomplish a more substantive form of equality. She speculated that if more
women were in politics, they would push for a legislative agenda that would
reflect women's values, such as a family and medical leave policy that would
permit both men and women to take time off from work to care for a relative.'29
The belief that substantive equality is a matter for the legislature rather than
the judiciary is deeply embedded in American equal protection jurisprudence
and extends beyond claims of gender inequality. Substantive equality has been
defined as "directed at eliminating individual, institutional and systemic
discrimination against disadvantaged groups which effectively undermines
their full and equal social, economic, political and cultural participation in
society.""13 The case that firmly established the judiciary's unwillingness to
128 Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Barbara Flagg, Some Reflections on the Feminist Legal Thought
of the 1970s, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 9, 17.
129 Id. at 18. This approach, grounded in separation ofpowers, stands in sharp contrast to the
approach that the Supreme Court of India has taken. As described infra, the Supreme Court of
India has relied on constitutional provisions to uphold reservations for women and has engaged
in a form ofjudicial activism made necessary by the failures of the political branches. See infra
notes 147-74, 271-77, 302-32 and accompanying text.
130 KAPUR & CossMAN, supra note 4, at 176. Many feminist scholars have argued for a more
substantive theory of equality. See, e.g., Mary Becker, Patriarchy and Inequality: Towards a
Substantive Feminism, 1999 U. C-n. LEGAL F. 21 (advocating "relational feminism"); Herma Hill
Kay, Equality and Difference: The Case of Pregnancy, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1985)
(advocating equality ofopportunity); Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75
CAL. L. REv. 1279 (1987) (advocating an "acceptance model" whose focus is on eliminating
unequal consequences of gender differences); Stephanie Wildman, The Legitimation of Sex
Discrimination: A Critical Response to Supreme Court Jurisprudence, 63 OR. L. REV. 265
(1984) (advocating a "participatory perspective") [hereinafter Wildman, Legitimation];
Stephanie M. Wildman, Privilege, Gender, and the Fourteenth Amendment: Reclaiming Equal
Protection of the Laws, 13 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REv. 707, 712-13 (2004) (advocating
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adopt substantive equality is Washington v. Davis,' a race discrimination
case. There, applicants for the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police
Department challenged the use of a written examination that operated to
exclude four times as many black applicants as white. The Court rejected the
claim, holding that for equal protection purposes, heightened scrutiny is not
triggered absent intentional discrimination.' Thus, the fact that a government
policy has a disparate effect on racial minorities does not offend the equality
guarantee. 1
33
The same approach has been applied to gender discrimination claims.
Perhaps the most graphic example is Geduldig v. Aiello.134 In that case, the
state's disability insurance system excluded pregnancy-related disabilities, but
included disabilities affecting only men, such as prostatectomies and
circumcision. '35 The Court rejected a sex discrimination claim, finding that the
statute did not create a sex classification, but rather a classification between
pregnant women and non-pregnant persons. "There is no risk from which men
are protected and women are not. Likewise, there is no risk from which
women are protected and men are not."'136 Putting aside the obvious fallacy in
that proposition given the fact that disabilities affecting only men were
covered, the more serious flaw in the Court's thinking is that it reflects a male-
normed view of equality. Formal equality is not violated because men and
women are treated the same. That is true to the extent that everyone is being
denied pregnancy benefits. What the analysis clearly leaves out is the fact that
only women can get pregnant and therefore, only women are hurt by the
classification. Since formal equality is not concerned with a law's
analysis of "systemic privilege" to clarify the meaning of equal protection laws) [hereinafter
Wildman, Vision and Revision].
131 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
2 "Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious
racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution. Standing alone, it does not trigger the rule
that racial classifications are to be subjected to the strictest scrutiny and are justifiable only by
the weightiest of considerations." Id. at 242 (internal citation omitted).
13 "[W]e have not held that a law, neutral on its face and serving ends otherwise within the
power of government to pursue, is invalid under the Equal Protection Clause simply because it
may affect a greater proportion of one race than of another." Id.
134 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
131 Id. at 501 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (making the point that the statute covered disabilities
exclusively or disproportionately suffered by men, including prostatectomies, circumcision,
hemophilia, and gout).
136 Id. at 496-97. The decision was effectively overruled when Congress enacted the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000), which defined sex discrimination
to include discrimination based on pregnancy.
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consequences, however, the fact that only women were disadvantaged by the
classification did not amount to a violation of equal protection "[a]bsent a
showing that distinctions involving pregnancy are mere pretexts designed to
effect an invidious discrimination against the members of one sex."' 37 In other
words, classifications that disadvantage women do not violate equal protection
unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the legislature acted for the purpose
of hurting women."'
Justice Brennan, writing in dissent in Geduldig, concluded that the
exclusion of disabilities related to normal pregnancy constituted invidious sex
discrimination:
In my view, by singling out for less favorable treatment a gender-
linked disability peculiar to women, the State has created a
double standard for disability compensation: a limitation is
imposed upon the disabilities for which women workers may
recover, while men receive full compensation for all disabilities
suffered, including those that affect only or primarily their sex,
such as prostatectomies, circumcision, hemophilia, and gout. In
effect, one set of rules is applied to females and another to males.
Such dissimilar treatment of men and women, on the basis of
physical characteristics inextricably linked to one sex, inevitably
constitutes sex discrimination.' 39
137 Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 497.
3' The Court's seeming disregard for the fact that only women were being denied pregnancy
related benefits appears to be inconsistent with the Court's recognition of biological differences
in other contexts. See, e.g., Tuan Anh Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53 (2001):
To fail to acknowledge even our most basic biological differences-such
as the fact that a mother must be present at birth but the father need not
be-risks making the guarantee of equal protection superficial, and so
disserving it. Mechanistic classification of all our differences as stereotypes
would operate to obscure those misconceptions and prejudices that are real.
The distinction embodied in the statutory scheme here at issue is not marked
by misconception and prejudice, nor does it show disrespect for either class.
The difference between men and women in relation to the birth process is a
real one, and the principle of equal protection does not forbid Congress to
address the problem at hand in a manner specific to each gender.
Id. at 73.
'9 Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 501 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Another example of the Court's refusal to consider the disparate effects of
a classification is Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney.4'
There, the Court rejected an equal protection challenge to veterans'
preferences in employment, which overwhelmingly operated to exclude
women. Citing Washington v. Davis, the Court concluded that the equality
guarantee was not violated absent proof that the legislature enacted the policy
for thepurpose of excluding women. 4' In other words, demonstrating that the
legislature enacted the law with knowledge of its consequences does not
establish the requisite intent."' Thus, the Court in Feeney rejected the
common sense proposition that an actor is generally thought to intend the
foreseeable and natural consequences of his or her actions and reversed the
district court which, in a concurring opinion, had held that "the cutting-off of
women's opportunities was an inevitable concomitant of the chosen
scheme-as inevitable as the proposition that if tails is up, heads must be
down. Where a law's consequences are that inevitable, can they meaningfully
be described as unintended?"'43 The Court's answer is yes, representing a
definitive repudiation of substantive equality in favor of formal equality: "the
settled rule [is] that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees equal laws, not
equal results."'"
The Court's strict adherence to formal equality has been unwavering and
linear. The Court has moved from upholding sex classifications because
women and men are different, to upholding sex classifications because men
1- 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
141 "Discriminatory purpose," however, implies more than intent as volition or
intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that the decisionmaker, in this
case a state legislature, selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at
least in part "because of," not merely "in spite of," its adverse effects upon an
identifiable group. Yet nothing in the record demonstrates that this
preference for veterans was originally devised or subsequently re-enacted
because it would accomplish the collateral goal of keeping women in a
stereotypic and predefined place in the Massachusetts Civil Service.
Id. at 279 (internal citations omitted).
142 The same reasoning was applied in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), where the
Court rejected an equal protection challenge to Georgia's death penalty statute, which had a
severe disparate impact on racial minorities. For a discussion of the Washington v. Davis line
of cases, see Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of
Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REv. 1111 (1997).
141 Feeney, 442 U.S. at 278 (quoting the concurring opinion in the District Court, 451 F.
Supp. 143, 151 (D. Mass. 1978)).
'44 Id. at 273.
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and women are the same. At both ends of the spectrum, the Court has retained
its commitment to treating equals alike.
This rigid adherence to principles of formal equality is not reflected in the
jurisprudence of the Indian Supreme Court, which, as the next sections
indicate, moves between theories of formal and substantive equality.
III. GENDER DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
The Indian Supreme Court's interpretation of the various equality
guarantees found in the Constitution has been uneven, alternating between
formal and substantive equality, with a heavy emphasis on protectionism.
Before analyzing the Supreme Court's decisions, it is important to keep in
mind the various ways in which India's Constitution authorizes this
protectionist approach.
The Constitution of India is radically different from the U.S. Constitution
when it comes to addressing societal inequalities. India's Constitution
recognizes that formal equality alone is insufficient to ameliorate centuries of
inequalities among groups: "'Equality is one of the magnificent cornerstones
of Indian democracy.' We have, however, yet to turn that corner.' ' 145 In
recognition of the continuing effects of past discrimination,' 41 the Indian
14' Gov't of Andhra Pradesh v. Vijayakumar, A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 1648.
146 The process of equalisation and benign discrimination are integral, and not
antagonistic, to the principle of equality. In a hierarchical society with an
indelible feudal stamp and incurable actual inequality, it is sophistry to argue
that progressive measures to eliminate group disabilities and promote
collective equality are anathema on the score that every individual has
entitlement on pure merit of marks. This narrow "unsocial" pedantry subverts
the seminal essence of equal opportunity even for those who are humble and
handicapped. Meritocracy cannot displace equality when the utterly backward
masses labour under group disabilities. So we may weave those special
facilities into the web of equality which, in an equitable setting, provide for
the weak and promote their levelling up so that, in the long run, the
community at large may enjoy a general measure of real equal opportunity.
So we hold, even apart from Art. 15(3) and (4), that equality is not negated
or neglected where special provisions are geared to the larger goal of the
disabled getting over their disablement consistently with the general good and
individual merit.
Saran v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 820.
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Constitution embraces an elaborate system of "protective discrimination"' 47
authorizing special protection for historically vulnerable groups.1
48
This system of protective discrimination is woven throughout the
Constitution. The guarantee of equality begins with Article 14, which, like the
Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution, guarantees equal protection
of the laws.'49 This is merely the jumping off point for a series of explicit
equality guarantees for women contained in the Fundamental Rights section
of the Indian Constitution: Article 15(1) prohibits the State from
discriminating on the basis of sex; 5' Article 15(2) prohibits discrimination in
public accommodations on the basis of sex;' 5 ' Article 16(1) guarantees
147 Id.
141 Article 15(3) of the Constitution of India authorizes the State to make "special provision
for women and children." INDIA CONST. art. 15(3); Article 15(4) authorizes the State to make
"special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of
citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes." Id. art. 15(4); Article 16(4)(A)
authorizes provisions "for [the] reservation ... of posts [or appointments] ... in favour of the
Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes which, in the opinion of the State, are not adequately
represented in the services under the State." Id. art. 16(4)(A); Articles 330 and 332 mandate the
reservation of seats in the House of the People and in the state legislatures for members of the
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Id. arts. 330, 332; Article 243D mandates the
reservation of seats on panchayats (village councils) for members of the Scheduled Castes,
Scheduled Tribes, and women. Id. art. 243D.
149 Article 14 provides: "The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the
equal protection of the laws within the territory of India." Id. art. 14. Classifications challenged
pursuant to Article 14 must meet the following standard: "[C]lassification among different
groups of persons and differentiation between such classes is permissible provided (1) the
classification is founded on intelligible differentia between the groups and (2) such differentia
have a rational nexus with the objects sought to be achieved by the statute." Gov't of Andhra
Pradesh v. Vijayakumar, A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 1648 (upholding affirmative action for women in
public employment). The test is one of rationality:
Article 14 of the Constitution ensures equality among equals: its aim is to
protect persons similarly placed against discrimination [sic] treatment. It does
not however operate against rational classification. A person setting up a
grievance of denial of equal treatment by law must establish that between
persons similarly circumstanced, some were treated to their prejudice and the
different treatment had no reasonable relation to the object sought to be
achieved....
Lakshmi v. Punjab Univ., A.I.R. 2003 S.C. 3331. See also Javed v. Haryana, A.I.R. 2003 S.C.
3057 (upholding the requirement that panchayat members have no more than two children).
"0 Article 15(1) provides: "The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds
only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them." INDIA CONST. art. 15.
'51 Article 15(2) provides:
No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth
or any of them, be subject to any disability, liability, restriction or condition
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equality of opportunity in government employment and appointment to
government office;'52 and Article 16(2) prohibits discrimination on the basis
of sex in public employment or appointment to state office."'a
In addition to the equality provisions contained in the Fundamental Rights,
the Constitution of India contains non-justiciable Directive Principles'54 that
direct states to work toward the emancipation of women, including equal pay
for equal work,155 just and humane conditions of work, and maternity relief. 56
In the section of the Indian Constitution listing the Fundamental Duties of
citizens, the Constitution declares that it is a fundamental duty of every citizen
to "renounce practices derogatory to the dignity of women."' 57 Further, like
the U.S. Constitution, the Constitution of India prohibits discrimination against
women with respect to voting.'58
The most significant of all the provisions guaranteeing equality to women
is Article 15(3), which authorizes the State to make "special provision for
with regard to (a) access to shops, public restaurants, hotels and places of
public entertainment; or (b) the use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads and
places of public resort maintained wholly or partly out of State funds or
dedicated to the use of the general public.
Id.
152 Article 16(1) provides: "There shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters
relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State." Id. art. 16.
"' Article 16(2) provides: "No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex,
descent, place of birth, residence or any of them, be ineligible for, or discriminated against in
respect of, any employment or office under the State." Id.
154 Part IV of the Constitution contains principles for the state and its agencies to follow in
formulating policy. The goal of the Directive Principles is to establish a new social order
consisting of social, economic, and political justice. See Harmon & Kaufnan, supra note 12,
at 47 n.84. The Indian Supreme Court has held that, unlike Fundamental Rights, Directive
Principles are not justiciable, meaning that they are not enforceable by the courts. See Islamic
Acad. ofEduc. v. Karnataka, A.I.R. 2003 S.C. 3724; Thomas v. Union of India, A.I.R. 2000 S.C.
1650.
15' Article 39 provides: "The State shall, in particular, direct its policy towards securing...
(d) that there is equal pay for equal work for both men and women." INDIA CONST. art. 39.
156 Article 42 provides: "The State shall make provision for securing just and humane
conditions of work and for maternity relief." Id. art. 42.
157 Id. art. 51A(e).
s' Article 325 provides:
There shall be one general electoral roll for every territorial constituency for
election to either House of Parliament or to the House or either House of the
Legislature of a State and no person shall be ineligible for inclusion in any
such roll or claim to be included in any special electoral roll for any such
constituency on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex or any of them.
Id. art. 325.
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women and children."' 59 This provision "was envisaged as a method of
protective discrimination," 6 ' designed to relieve women from "moribund...
formal equality."' 61 Article 15(3) reflects the constitutional philosophy that
true equality cannot be achieved in the absence of affirmative steps to remove
the persistent inequality of opportunity between women and men in Indian
society: 62 "Article 15(3) treats women as a class, mitigates the rigour of
absolute equality enshrined in Article 14 and its species Articles 15(1) and
16(1) and enjoins the State to make any special provision to remedy past
injustice and to advance their status, socio-economic and political."'63
Article 15(3) thus provides the justification for the protectionist approach
evident in a multitude of Indian Supreme Court decisions. These decisions
defy easy categorization: some uphold affirmative action programs and
reservations for women and embrace a substantive equality model; others
interpret ambiguous statutory provisions and personal laws in a manner
designed to fulfill the constitutional guarantee of equality; and others rely on
formal equality theory to uphold sex classifications based on real or perceived
differences between men and women.
A. Decisions Concerning Affirmative Action and Reservations for Women
Drawing on the constitutional authorization of protective discrimination
and substantive equality,"6 the Indian Supreme Court has upheld the
reservation of seats for women in municipal elections,'65 in managing
9 Article 15(3) provides: "Nothing in this article.., shall prevent the State from making any
special provision for women and children." Id. art. 15(3).
160 Srivastava v. Madhya Pradesh, A.I.R. 1999 S.C. 2894.
'61 Jain v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 3021, order set aside on other grounds, Jain v.
Union of India, 1998 Indlaw S.C. 1669.
162 See Singh v. Union of India, (1978) Indlaw DEL 2.
163 Sesharathamma v. Manikyamma, (1991) 3 S.C.R. 717 (Ramaswamy, J.).
'" In addition to Article 15(3)'s authorization of special provisions for women, India's
Constitution explicitly authorizes reservations for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, and other
backward classes. See INDIA CONST. arts. 15(4), 16(4), 330, and 332. In 1993, the Constitution
was amended to mandate the reservation of seats for women on panchayats, units of local self-
governance. For an analysis of this experiment in women's empowerment, see Harmon &
Kaufman, supra note 12, at 74-89.
165 See, e.g., Agarwal v. Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 1440 (holding that the reservation
of seats for women on municipal boards is protected by Article 15(3)); More v. Bombay, 1953
A.I.R. (Bom.) 311 (upholding provision ofthe BombayMunicipal Boroughs Act which reserved
seats for women in the election).
[Vol. 34:557
WOMEN AND LAW
committees of state cooperative societies, 166 and in employment. 167
Reservations of seats for women in educational institutions have been
legislated by the states and repeatedly upheld by the High Courts.' 68 These
decisions recognize that compensating for discrimination is not an exception
to equality but a necessary means of achieving equality.
169
The Indian Supreme Court has held that the power conferred by Article
15(3) is "wide enough to cover the entire range of State activity including
employment under the State."' 7 ° Thus, in Government ofAndhra Pradesh v.
Viayakumar,"'7 the Court upheld affirmative action and reservation ofjobs for
women in public employment, noting that "[a]n important limb of this concept
of gender equality is creati[ng] job opportunities for women."'72 The decision
explains the interplay between Article 15(3) and the Constitution's other
equality guarantees:
The insertion of clauses [sic] (3) of Article 15 on relation to
women is a recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of
this country have been socially and economically handicapped.
As a result, they are unable to participate in the socio-economic
activities of the nation on a footing of equality. It is in order to
eliminate this socio-economic backwardness of women and to
empower them in a matter that would bring about effective
equality between men and women that Article 15(3) is placed in
Article 15. Its object is to strengthen and improve the status of
women .... To say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities
166 Reddy v. Andhra Pradesh, (1993) 4 S.C.C. 439 (upholding reservations for women on the
board of cooperative societies under Article 15(3)).
167 See, e.g., Gupta v. Uttar Pradesh, (2005) 5 S.C.C. 172 (holding that reservations of posts
for women as teachers is authorized by Article 15(3)); Lakshmi v. Punjab Univ., A.I.R. 2003
S.C. 3331 (upholding preference in favor of appointing a woman principal); Union of India v.
Prabhakaran, (1997) 11 S.C.C. 638 (upholding reservation of positions as clerks for women);
Gov't of Andhra Pradesh v. Vijayakumar, A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 1648 (allowing reservation of 30%
of seats in government posts for women); Pansari v. Orissa, A.I.R. 2000 S.C. 1531 (upholding
state policy to broaden women's employment opportunities by providing 30% of medical store
licenses to women in order to foster women's self-reliance).
168 See, e.g., Chandra v. Bihar, 1996 A.I.R. 88 (Pat.) (allowing preferences for females in
medical school program); Kavitha v. Tamil Nadu, 1992 A.I.R. 359 Mad. (allowing allotment of
seats for women for cinematography degree program).
169 See, e.g., Sawhney v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 477.
170 Gov't of Andhra Pradesh v. Vijayakumar, A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 1648.
171 Id.
172 Id
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for women cannot be created would be [to] cut at the very root of
the underlying inspiration behind this article. Making special
provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under
the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power
conferred under Article 15(3), is not whittled down in any
manner by Article 16.171
The Court in Viayakumar, rejected the argument that affirmative action
and reservations are inconsistent with a meritocracy:
[E]fficiency, competence and merit are not synonymous and it is
undeniable that nature has endowed merit upon members of
backward classes as much as it has endowed upon members of
other classes. What is required is an opportunity to prove it. It
is precisely a lack of opportunity which has led to social
backwardness, not merely amongst what are commonly
considered as the backward classes, but also amongst women.
Reservation, therefore, is one of the constitutionally recognised
methods of overcoming this type of backwardness. Such
reservation is permissible under Article 15(3).1 4
The Indian Supreme Court's consistency in upholding reservations for
women is a strong indication of its willingness to embrace substantive equality.
The Court's validation of "protective discrimination" recognizes that equality
will not be achieved without redressing the current effects of centuries of
discrimination.
B. Decisions Involving Statutory Interpretation andlnterpretation ofPersonal
Laws
Article 15(3) has been used by the Supreme Court not only to uphold laws
that treat women more favorably than men, but also to interpret ambiguous
laws in a manner that protects women. 75 This rule of construction has been
173 Id.
174 Id.
17' Ara v. Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 2002 S.C. 3551; Singh v. Ramendri Smt., A.I.R. 2000 S.C.
952; Satpathyv. Dixit,A.I.R. 1999 S.C. 3348; Sesharathammav. Manikyamma,(1991)3 S.C.R.
717; Kaushal v. Kaushal, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 1807.
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used repeatedly to interpret Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
which requires maintenance payments to needy wives:
[Section 125] is a measure of social justice and specially
enacted to protect women and children and falls within the
constitutional sweep of Article 15(3) reinforced by Article 39.
We have no doubt that sections of statutes calling for
construction by courts are not petrified print but vibrant words
with social functions to fulfil [sic]. The brooding presence of the
constitutional empathy for the weaker sections like women and
children must inform interpretation if it [is] to have social
relevance. So viewed, it is possible to be selective in picking out
that interpretation out of two alternatives which advance the
cause - the cause of the derelicts.'76
In Ara v. Uttar Pradesh,'77 the Court noted that Article 15(3) "has
compelling, compassionate relevance in the context of [Section] 125 and the
benefit of [the] doubt, if any, in statutory interpretation belongs to the ill-used
wife and the derelict divorcee." '78 Thus, in Singh v. Ramendri Smt., 1 9 the
Court interpreted the statute to apply to a divorced woman's right to
maintenance, noting that "[a] woman after divorce becomes a destitute."'' °
Although the Court did award maintenance to the woman, it left intact the
finding that the wife's refusal to live with her husband's abusive parents while
he was in the army constituted desertion."'
A dramatic example of the Indian Supreme Court construing a statute in a
manner designed to benefit women is Municipal Corp. of Delhi v. Female
Workers,182 where the Court held that temporary workers are entitled to
76 Singh v. Ramendri Smt., A.I.R. 2000 S.C. 952 (quoting Kaushal v. Kausha, A.I.R. 1978
S.C. 1807).
177 A.I.R. 2002 S.C. 3551; see Satpathy v. Dixit, A.I.R. 1999 S.C. 3348 (stating that: "The
provision under Section 125 is not to be utilised for defeating the rights conferred by the
legislature on the destitute women, children or parents who are victims of the social
environment").
'78 Ara v. Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 2002 S.C. 3551 (quoting Tahira v. Hussain, A.I.R. 1979 S.C.
362).
1'9 A.I.R. 2000 S.C. 952.
18o Id.
181 Id.
182 A.I.R. 2000 S.C. 1274.
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maternity benefits. 8 3 The Court relied on the Indian Constitution's Preamble,
which promises social and economic justice, and interpreted the Maternity
Benefit Act as authorizing maternity benefits to women on the "muster roll"
who were essentially day laborers. 184
Article 15(3) has also been used to interpret the Hindu Succession Act of
1956 in a way that benefits women by holding that the statute must be
construed harmoniously with the constitutional goal ofremoving gender-based
discrimination and effectuating economic empowerment of women.'85 In
Sesharathamma v. Manikyamma,'86 the Court quoted Sir Henry Maine who
stated "the degree in which personal immunity and proprietary capacity of
women are recognised in a particular state or community is a test of the degree
of the advance of its civilisation."'87  The Court interpreted the Hindu
Succession Act to give women the absolute right to property even where a will
purported to limit the woman's right to the property.'88 The Court relied on the
"constitutional goal to render socio-economic justice, to relieve [the] Hindu
female from degradation, disabilities, disadvantages and restrictions under
which Hindu females have been languishing over centuries and to integrate
them in national and international life."'189
Other cases where the Indian Supreme Court has adopted interpretations of
personal law that benefit women include Kumar v. Bhada,190 where the Court
rejected a claim ofj oint ownership of property, finding that under Hindu law,
the wife was the absolute owner of "stridhana"; 9' and Hariharan v. Reserve
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 Mudaliar v. Idol of Sri Swaminathaswami, A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 1697.
It is true that Section 30 of the Act and the relevant provisions of the Act
relating to the execution of the Wills need to be given full effect and the right
to disposition of a Hindu male derives full measure thereunder. But the right
to equality, removing handicaps and discrimination against a Hindu female
by reason of operation of existing law should be in conformity with the right
to equality enshrined in the Constitution and the personal law also needs to
be in conformity with the constitutional goal. Harmonious interpretation,
therefore, is required to be adopted in giving effect to the relevant provisions
consistent with the constitutional animation to remove gender-based
discrimination in matters of marriage, succession etc.
816 (1991) 3 S.C.R. 717.
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 Id.
190 (1997) 2 S.C.C. 397.
191 Id.
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Bank of India,19 2 where the Court held that the Hindu Minority and Guardian
Act must be interpreted so as not to afford a preference for fathers over
mothers as guardians. 93 The statute at issue in Hariharan provided that the
natural guardian of a Hindu boy or an unmarried girl is "the father, and after
him, the mother."' 94 Through a particularly strained reading of the text, the
Court concluded that the provision "is capable of such construction as would
retain it within the constitutional limits.'
195
These cases reflect the Indian Supreme Court's view that "the personal laws
conferring inferior status on women [are] anathema to equality" and
inconsistent with Article 15(3).196 These decisions also draw support from
international covenants, including the Convention on the Elimination of all
Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), 97 on which the Court
relies to support its interpretation of personal laws in a way that furthers
women's equality. 98
Although the Indian Supreme Court's interpretation of the codification of
Hindu law has not been particularly problematic, the same cannot be said with
respect to cases that require the Court to resolve the tension between the
Constitution's commitment to both women's rights and minority rights.
9 9
Under British rule, laws were secularized in areas that mattered to the British,
192 A.I.R. 1999 S.C. 1149. This case is roughly comparable to Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71
(1971), where the U.S. Supreme Court struck down an automatic preference for fathers over
mothers in administering a child's estate. See also supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
" Hariharan v. Reserve Bank of India, A.I.R. 1999 S.C. 1149.
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 Mudaliar v. Swaminathaswani, A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 1697, 15.
197 CEDAW, supra note 5.
198 See, e.g., Hariharan v. Reserve Bank of India, A.I.R. 1999 S.C. 1149. In Mudaliar v.
Swaminathaswani, A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 1697, 19, the Indian Supreme Court relied extensively on
the language of CEDAW:
The preamble of CEDAW reiterates that discrimination against women
violates the principles of equality of rights and respect for human dignity; is
an obstacle to the participation on equal terms with men in the political,
social, economic and cultural life of their country; hampers the growth of the
personality from society and family and makes more difficult for the full
development of potentialities of women in the service of their countries and
of humanity. Poverty of women is a handicap. Establishment of a new
international economic order based on equality and justice will contribute
significantly towards the promotion of equality between men and women etc.
9 In an effort to accommodate India's extraordinary diversity, the Constitution guarantees
minority, religious, cultural, and linguistic rights. See, e.g., INDIA CONST. arts. 15, 25-28
(guaranteeing religious freedoms) and arts. 29-30 (guaranteeing cultural and educational rights).
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whereas "private law," law that most affected the lives of women, was not
thought to be relevant to colonial interests.2"' This public/private dichotomy
was continued at Independence, with secular laws covering everything but
inheritance, succession, matrimonial and family law matters. 20 ' Thus for
example, rape has long been treated as a crime but domestic violence remains
largely unaddressed, confined to the private non-secular sphere.20 2 Similarly,
where a woman has chosen employment away from her husband, the courts
have ordered restitution of conjugal "rights," with constitutional challenges
rejected on the ground that the family is beyond the reach of the law.20 3 In
Rani v. Kumar,2° the Indian Supreme Court approved the High Court's view
that "the introduction of the cold principles of Constitutional Law will have the
effect of weakening the marriage bond., 205
Whether or not private law should remain separate from secular law
presents a continuing controversy in India.206 The Constitution envisages the
adoption of a uniform civil code, which would replace the system of personal
law that governs India's different religious groups.207 The enactment of a
uniform civil code, however, has proved politically impossible, which has left
different religious groups governed by their own personal laws.208 The Court's
role in hearing challenges involving Muslim law has attempted to prioritize
women's rights over religious claims but, as we shall see, has been largely
ineffective.20 9
The Indian Supreme Court's interpretation of Muslim law has sought to
protect women's rights. For example, the Court has construed Muslim law in
200 See Jaising, supra note 16, at 298; see also FLAvIA AGNES, LAW AND GENDER
INEQUALITY: THE POLITICS OF WOMEN'S RIGHTS IN INDIA 58 (1999).
201 See MINISTRY OF EDUC. & SOC. WELFARE, INDIA DEP'T OF SOC. WELFARE, TOWARDS
EQUALITY: REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN IN INDIA 140-46 (1974).
202 See, e.g., Jaising, supra note 16, at 309 (stating that: "The public/private divide has been
used.., usually to the detriment of women").
203 Rani v. Kumar, (1984) 3 S.C.C. 90 (rejecting a constitutional challenge to restitution of
conjugal "rights").
204 Id.
205 Id.
206 See AGNES, supra note 200, at 94-106; see also BRENDA COSSMAN & RATNA KAPUR,
SECULARISM'S LAST SIGH?: HINDUTVA AND THE (MIS)RuLE OF LAW (1999); KHUSHWANT SINGH,
THE END OF INDIA (2003).
207 Article 44 of the Directive Principles provides: "The State shall endeavour to secure for
the citizens a uniform civil code throughout the territory of India." INDIA CONST. art. 44.
208 For an insightful analysis of the politicization of secularism, see generally COSSMAN &
KAPUR, supra note 206.
209 See infra notes 210-25 and accompanying text.
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a way that treats the impotence of a husband as a ground for divorce, thus
entitling a wife to maintenance,21 and it has also constricted a Muslim
husband's ability to unilaterally divorce his wife.21
The most famous of the Indian Supreme Court's decisions in the area of
personal laws is the Shah Bano case, which has come to symbolize the struggle
in India between secularism and minority rights.212 In this case, the Court
attempted to mediate competing demands between minority rights and
women's rights but chose a path that ultimately was undone by the political
branches.
Shah Bano had been married for forty-three years, with five children, when
her husband divorced her.21 3 She petitioned for maintenance and was granted
179.20 rupees (approximately $4.00) a month. The husband, who was an
attorney earning 60,000 rupees a year, appealed.214 The issue in the case
involved the clash between Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
which requires maintenance of a wife unable to support herself, and Muslim
Personal Law, which requires payment of maintenance for only three
months.215 The Court avoided the conflict between the two laws by
interpreting the Qur'an in a way that reconciled the provisions: "For divorced
women [m]aintenance (should be provided) [o]n a reasonable ([s]cale). This
is the duty of the righteous. ' '216
The decision was met with fury from the Muslim community, with massive
demonstrations against the Court's usurpation of Muslim authority. 21 7 The
Congress Party, facing electoral losses, passed the Muslim Women Act of
1986,218 which essentially overruled the Shah Bano decision by excluding all
Muslim women from coverage under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal
210 Janmohamadkhan v. Yasinkhan, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1972.
211 Ara v. Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 2002 S.C. 3551.
212 Khan v. Shah Bano Begum, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 945.
213 Id.
214 Id.
215 Id.
216 Id. The Court called on the State to move toward adopting a uniform civil code. Id. 32;
see Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India, 1995 (3) S.C.C. 635.
217 ELISABETH BUMILLER, MAY You BE THE MOTHER OF A HUNDRED SONS: A JOURNEY
AMONG THE WOMEN OF INDIA 166-67 (1990).
218 Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, No. 25 of 1986; INDIA CODE
(1986).
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Procedure.219 Shah Bano herself was pressured to withdraw her petition for
maintenance.22°
The Indian Supreme Court re-entered the fray in 2001 when the Muslim
Women Act of 1986 was challenged as violating the constitutional equality
guarantee.22' In Latifi v. Union oflndia, the Court interpreted the Act in a way
to avoid the constitutional question, finding that the requirement of
maintenance for only three months could be expanded when required to ensure
the woman's future well-being.222 The Court held that an interpretation of the
Act that would leave Muslim women in a less advantageous position than
Hindu, Buddhist, Jain, Parsi or Christian women would violate the
constitutional guarantee of equality. 2 3
The Court's efforts to reconcile the competing claims of gender equality
and religious autonomy have not been replicated in the political branches. To
the contrary, the question has become thoroughly political, with the Hindu
right pressing for the secularization of personal laws in the name of women's
rights. 24 In the meantime, women's rights remain subordinated to religious
claims.225
219 Siobhan Mullally, Feminism and Multicultural Dilemmas in India: Revisiting the Shah
Bano Case, 24 OxFoRDJ. LEGALAFF. 671, 681 (2004). The Muslim Women Act of 1986 was
later interpreted by the High Court of Calcutta, in a case dubbed Shah Bano II, to require
maintenance for a Muslim woman until remarriage. The Court interpreted iddat as the period
between divorce and remarriage. Shades of Shah Bano, TRIBUNE, June 21, 2000, available at
http://www.tribuneindia.com/2000/20000621/edit.htm#2.
220 Mullally, supra note 219, at 681; BUMILLER, supra note 217, at 165-70.
221 Latifi v. Union of India, A.I.R. 2001 S.C. 3958.
222 Id. The Court, however, recently agreed to hear a case challenging the legality of religious
courts following an Islamic tribunal's decision ordering a rape victim to move in with her father-
in-law who is the accused rapist. Indian SC to Rule on Legality of Religious Courts, DAILY
TIMES, Aug. 18, 2005, available at http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.pk/deafult.asp?page
=story- I8-8-2005_pg4_14. See also World Briefing Asia, India: Supreme Court to Rule on
Religious Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2005, at A12.
223 Id.
224 The Hindu right campaigned against the 1986 legislation, calling it anti-women. "Those
who do not accept ou[r] Constitution and laws, should quit the country and go to Karachi or
Lahore." Mullally, supra note 219, at 682.
25 See, e.g., Jaising, supra note 16, at 302 (criticizing the Supreme Court's unwillingness to
directly address the conflict between minority rights and women's rights: "The truth is that the
history of law relating to women is also the history of property law and to disturb the status quo
would be to seriously question the existing property ownership patterns in a society based on
male lines"); Asian Centre for Human Rights, Cultural Courts: Where Victims are Held Guilty,
July 6,2005, http://www.achrweb.org/Review/2005/80-05.htm (detailing women's human rights
abuses under religious law).
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C. Decisions Upholding Sex Classifications Based on Gender Differences
Relying on Article 15(3), the Indian Supreme Court seems to have adopted
the same role of benevolent protector that the U.S. Supreme Court played until
the 1970s, upholding laws that treat men and women differently on the grounds
that they protect women.226 Whereas the U.S. Supreme Court, beginning in the
1970s, used formal equality theory to prohibit overbroad generalizations about
differences between men and women, the Supreme Court of India continues
to uphold classifications on the ground that women require protection. The
obvious danger of this protectionist approach is that it can be used to
perpetuate the very stereotypes that have kept women in a subordinate
position.
On the ground that women need protection and that Article 15(3) authorizes
such protection, the Indian Supreme Court has upheld a wide variety of laws
defended on the ground that the sex classification benefits women. The Court
has upheld a provision in a rent control law providing special benefits to
women landowners because "[a] widow is undoubtedly a vulnerable person in
our society and requires special protection";2 7 an adultery law criminalizing
the conduct of the man and not the woman, because women tend to be the
victim not the perpetrator;122 and an employer's marriage proscription for
women, but not men, because Indian women should be deterred from marrying
too young.229 Consistentwith this approach, Indian High Courts230 have upheld
laws disabling women from receiving service of process, 23' laws entitling
women but not men to bail,232 and laws making it a crime to offend the
modesty of a woman but not a man.233
226 See, e.g., Mahsi v. Union of India, (1994) 1 S.C.J. 90 (upholding gender based divorce
laws based on women's weaker physique and general vulnerability); Vishnu v. Union of India,
A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 1618 (upholding law that criminalized adultery by males but not females); Air
India v. Meerza, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1829 (upholding employment policy mandating retirement
upon marriage of female employees but not male employees).
227 Rahabhar Prods. Private Ltd. v. Tandon, A.I.R. 1998 S.C. 1639 (citing EMC Steel Ltd.
v. Union of India, (1991) 1 S.C.R. 381).
228 Vishnu v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 1618.
229 Air India v. Meerza, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1829.
230 Unlike the United States, India has one unified court system. The Indian Supreme Court
is the apex court and each state (or group of states) and territory has a High Court. See INDIA
CONST. art. 214.
231 Shahdad v. Abdullah, A.I.R. 1967 J. & K. 120.
232 Choki v. State, A.I.R. 1957 Raj. 10.
233 Girdhar v. State, A.I.R. 1953 M.B. 147.
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Many of these decisions reflect stereotypical thinking about women's
passivity and need for protection.234 Thus, in Vishnu v. Union ofIndia,235 the
Court rejected a challenge to Section 497 of the Indian Penal Code, which
defines the offense of adultery so as to criminalize the behavior of men only.
The Court reasoned that "[i]t is commonly accepted that it is the man who is
the seducer and not the woman,,13' and that any woman involved in an "illicit"
relationship "is a victim and not the author of the crime. 2 37 Similarly, in
Mahsi v. Union of India, 38 in language reminiscent of U.S. Supreme Court
Justice Bradley's explanation of why Myra Bradwell was not fit for the
practice of law, the Supreme Court of India upheld gender-based divorce laws
because of "the muscularly weaker physique of the woman, her general
vulnerable physical and social condition and her defensive and non-aggressive
nature and role." '239
The most indefensible of the Indian Supreme Court decisions upholding
gender classifications is Air India v. Meerza,240 where the Court rejected a
challenge on behalf of air hostesses employed by Air India to the different
retirement rules applied to them and their male counterparts, called pursers.
Among the rules challenged was the requirement that air hostesses, but not
pursers, had to retire upon marriage.241 Utilizing formal equality theory, the
Court relied on the fact that the men were paid more, were subject to different
promotional rules, and could retain their job upon marriage to support the fact
that the pursers and air hostesses were not similarly situated.242 The logic is
234 See infra notes 227-46 and accompanying text.
23 A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 1618.
236 Id.
237 Id. This decision was reaffirmed in Revathi v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 835.
238 (1995) 1 S.C.J. 90.
239 Id.; see also Ahmedabad Women Action Group v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 3614;
Rani v. Kumar, (1984) 3 S.C.C. 90 (rejecting a constitutional challenge to restitution of conjugal
"rights" and finding such right to be "inherent in the very institution of marriage itself').
240 A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1829.
241 Regulation 46 provided as follows:
Retiring Age: Subject to the provisions of sub-regulation (ii) hereof, an
employee shall retire from the service of the Corporation upon attaining the
age of 58 years, except in the following cases when he/she shall retire
earlier : ... (c) An Air Hostess, upon attaining the age of 30 years or on
marriage whichever occurs earlier ....
Id. 5.
242 Id. T 58 ("Having regard, therefore, to the various circumstances, incidents, service
conditions, promotional avenues, etc. of the AFPs and AHs the inference is irresistible that AHs
though members of the cabin crew are an entirely separate class governed by [a] different set of
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completely circular: Article 14's requirement that equals be treated alike is not
violated because the preferential treatment afforded males places them in a
different category.
The Court in Air India also rejected the claim that the different rules
violated Article 15 because the different treatment was not on the basis of sex
alone. With very little explanation, the Court concluded that the policies were
based on sex plus other considerations and, when reviewing such policies,
courts need to be practical.243
The Air India decision is filled with the protectionism that marks so many
of India's gender cases. One justification for the marriage restriction in Air
India was that it would insure that women would not marry at too young an
age, which could jeopardize their health and interfere with family planning
programs. 2" Even with respect to the one restriction struck down in Air India,
the requirement that women retire if they become pregnant, the Court
expressed outrage at an employment rule that constitutes "an open insult to
Indian womanhood - the most sacrosanct and cherished institution. 245
Requiring pregnant women to retire might discourage pregnancy which would
"divert the ordinary course of human nature." '246 Thus, in a variety of ways, the
Air India case represents equality theory used to perpetuate sexual stereotypes
rather than to ameliorate the gender inequities that result from sexual
stereotypes.
The Air India controversy was back before the Indian Supreme Court in
2003.247 In the intervening years, the air hostesses, acting through a union
representing both male and female employees, had entered into a number of
rules, regulations and conditions of service.").
243 Id. 66 (citing Muthamma v. Union of India, (1979) 4 S.C.C. 260).
244 Apart from improving the health of the employee, it helps a good deal in the
promotion and boosting up of our family planning programme. Secondly, if
a woman marries near about the age of 20 to 23 years, she becomes fully
mature and there is every chance of such a marriage proving a success, all
things being equal. Thirdly, it has been rightly pointed out to us by the
Corporation that if the bar of marriage within four years of service is removed
then the Corporation will have to incur huge expenditure in recruiting
additional AHs either on a temporary or on ad hoc basis to replace the
working AHs if they conceive and any period short of four years would be too
little a time for the Corporation to phase out such an ambitious plan.
Id. 77.
245 Id. 80.
246 Id.
247 See Air India Cabin Crew Ass'n v. Merchant, A.I.R. 2004 S.C. 187.
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agreements and settlements regarding seniority, promotion, and retirement age,
but distinctions between air hostesses and pursers remained for employees
hired before 1997.248 A group of fifty-three air hostesses, dissatisfied with the
settlements, formed a competing association consisting only of female
employees and brought suit in the Bombay High Court, seeking parity between
male and female employees .249 The High Court ordered parity, finding that the
lower retirement age for women and the different conditions of service for men
and women, including salary and seniority, were discriminatory.2 0 The Indian
Supreme Court reversed, in an opinion harshly critical of the Bombay High
Court.
2 5 1
The Court re-affirmed its previous decision, adding that the constitutional
prohibition of discrimination based only on sex does not prohibit special
treatment of women in employment "on their own demand" or special rules
that favor women. 2  Since women, acting through their union, had agreed to
different rules regarding retirement, there could be no constitutional
infirmity. 253 The decision does not reveal the role that women played in the
248 For example, women were required to retire from flight duties at age fifty, whereas men
could maintain flight duties until age fifty-eight. Id.
249 Id. 33.
250 Id. 35 (citing Writ Petition No. 1163 of 2000).
251 It is surprising that the High Court in the impugned judgment completely
side-stepped the legal issues firmly settled in the decision of three Judges'
Bench of this Court in Nergesh Meerza's case... which were binding on it.
By impugned judgment, the High Court has indirectly nullified the effect of
this Courts [sic] decision in [the] case ofNergesh Meerza ... and in doing so
relied on subsequent event....
We totally disapprove the reasoning and conclusions of the High Court in
the impugned judgment that differential treatment which was justified earlier
when Nergesh Meerza's case ... was decided, "has become arbitrary and
unreasonable because of the passage of the time and merger of cadres' after
1997. How could the High Court lose sight of the fact that apart from the
binding decision of this Court in Nergesh Meerza's case. . ., air hostesses of
executive cadre, who were all pre-1997 recruits, were bound, with majority
of air hostesses of workmen category, by the agreements and settlements as
also awards reached between them and the employer/ Air India.
Id.
252 Id. 41.
253 The early retirement age of 50 years from flying duties for female members
of the crew with an option to them to accept ground duties beyond 50 years
up to the age of 58 years being a service condition agreed to and incorporated
in a binding agreement or settlement and award reached with the employer,
the same cannot be held to be either arbitrary or discriminatory under Articles
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collective bargaining process. We are told that 684 of the 1138 air hostesses
were members of the union, but we are not told what number of men were
members and what influence the women exercised.1 4 The fact that far more
air hostesses were members of the union responsible for negotiating with Air
India than were members of the all-female union formed by petitioners to
achieve gender parity hardly insures that the agreement promotes women's
equality. The Court's deference to the process provides reason to question
whose voice and whose experience was heard: "In the course of industrial
adjudication through conciliation and negotiation the employer could
legitimately acknowledge women's perspective, their life experience and view
point. After giving consideration to the same, the employer could agree for
terms and conditions which suited the air hostesses. '255 Although the Court
wrote about respecting a decision by a majority of air hostesses to retire from
flight duties earlier than men, it remains unclear who was speaking for the
women and whether they truly had a voice at the table.
Whether or not the result represents women's interests is itself
controversial. The Court in the second Air India case clearly viewed the
different ages of retirement to be good for women: "In employment requiring
duties on [a]ircraft, gender-neutral provisions of service may not be found
necessarily to be beneficial for women. The nature of duties and functions on
board of an [aircraft] do deserve some kind of a different and preferential
treatment of women [as] compared to men. ' 256 With respect to the earlier
retirement age for women, the Court noted that "[t]here is nothing
objectionable for air hostesses to wish for a peaceful and tension-free life at
home with their families in the middle age and avoid remaining away for long
durations on international flights." '257
The protectionism exhibited by the Indian Supreme Court has been
replicated in a host of High Court decisions. For example, the High Court of
Rajasthan in Choki v. State258 relied on the "special provision" authorization
of Article 15(3) to reject a challenge to a provision of the Criminal Procedure
Code that permits bail for women, but not men, in certain serious criminal
15 and 16 of the Constitution. It is not a discrimination against females only
on ground of sex.
Id. 51.
254 Id. 33, 35.
255 Id. 41.
256 Id. 43.
257 Id. 59.
258 A.I.R. 1957 Raj. 10.
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cases.259 In Choki, a mother and father were accused of killing their child,
ordinarily a non-bailable offense. Pursuant to Section 497 of the Criminal
Procedure Code, however, which authorizes bail for women, individuals under
sixteen years of age, and the infirm, the mother was granted bail on the ground
that she "is a woman and she has got [another] young son.., and has nobody
to look after him."26  The High Court upheld the challenged statute,
reaffirming the State's right to make laws containing special provisions that
benefit women.26'
Similarly, in Shahdad v. Abdullah,262 the High Court of Jammu and
Kashmir upheld the constitutional validity of a statute disqualifying a woman
from accepting service of process. Relying on Article 15(3), the Court
explained that this statute "does not give them any disadvantageous position
but rather exonerates them from the responsibility of fastening notice of
service. ' This "exoneration" is justified, in part, by the traditional isolation
of women from society, as illustrated by the practice of purdah.26
Another case that illustrates the protectionist approach is Girdhar v.
State,265 where the High Court of Madhya Pradesh upheld a law criminalizing
assaults which outraged the modesty of a woman, but not a man.266 In addition
to upholding the classification as against an Article 14 challenge,267 the Court
also upheld the classification as against an Article 15 challenge, explaining
259 Id.
260 Id.
261 Id. (stating that: "The position in the Constitution appears to be that it is open to the State
to make laws containing special provisions for women and children, but no discrimination can
be made against them on account of their sex..
262 A.I.R. 1967 J. & K. 120.
263 Id. 33.
264 Purdah refers to the custom of women being veiled and otherwise separated from male
society and largely confined to the home.
265 A.I.R. 1953 M.B. 147.
266 Section 354 of the Indian Penal Code provides: "Whoever assaults or uses criminal
force ... [on] any woman, intending to outrage her modesty or knowing it to be likely that he
will thereby outrage her modesty, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may
extend to two years, or with fine, or with both." India Penal Code, No. 45 of 1860; INDIA CODE
(1860).
267 Article 14 provides that "[t]he State shall not deny to any person equality before the law
or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India." INDIA CONST. art. 14. The
standard for reviewing Article 14 claims is essentially rational basis review: the classification
must have a rational relationship to the object sought to be achieved. See Girdhar v. State, A.I.R.
1953 M.B. 147, 3. The Girdhar Court had no trouble concluding that the classification passed
this deferential test. Id. 4.
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that Article 15 prohibits discrimination on the basis only of sex.2 68 Thus,
where the discrimination is based not on sex alone but "also on considerations
of propriety, public morals, decency, decorum and rectitude," the legislation
does not offend Article 15.269 Outraging a woman's modesty is made criminal
not merely because women are women, but because of the factors
enumerated above .... No civilized country whose action is
directed towards securing "the greatest good of the greatest
number" can allow assaults or criminal force to women with
intent to outrage their modesty to go unpunished and permit the
position of women to be injuriously affected by chartered
libertines.27 °
Although the decisions described above reflect a form of protectionism
likely to perpetuate gender stereotypes and women's subordination,
protectionism has also been used in the service of overcoming women's
subaltern status. The special status of women in India's constitutional scheme
has been most effectively utilized by the Court in the area of sexual violence,
as illustrated in a recent decision entitled Satyanarayana v. Government of
Andhra Pradesh.27" ' In commemoration of India's fifty years of independence,
the state ofAndhra Pradesh issued a governmental order, essentially pardoning
prisoners who had been sentenced to life imprisonment and had already served
seven years. The order contained a number of exceptions, including one for
prisoners convicted of crimes against women. That exception was challenged
as violative of the equality principle contained in Airticle 14.272
The Indian Supreme Court rejected the challenge as a matter of
constitutional law and sound policy. Article 15(3) singles women out for
favorable treatment and therefore classifications by sex are explicitly allowed.
Moreover, given the seriousness and pervasiveness of gender violence, the
exception for crimes against women represents good social policy:
It is no exaggeration to place on record that instances of violence
against women and children, particularly females, such as rape,
268 Girdhar v. State, A.I.R. 1953 M.B. 147, 5.
269 Id.
270 Id.
27! (2003) 10 S.C.C. 78.
272 Id. 6.
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dowry deaths, domestic violence, bride-burning, molestation,
brazen ill-treatment of horror, vulgarity and indecency are not
only rampant but on phenomenal increase casting a shadow of
shame on the society, the culture and governance of this country
and it seems that cruelty to women and problems of battered
wives have become ironically almost a worldwide phenomenon.
Such a situation deserves a special treatment in the hands of the
State.273
The Indian Supreme Court's protectionist attitude, however problematic in
other contexts, seems warranted in the area of sexual violence because of the
myriad ways in which gender violence operates as the most extreme form of
gender inequality and contributes to women's continuing disempowerment.
The Satyanarayana opinion is consistent with a series of truly stunning
decisions, where the Court has stepped into the void created by the political
branches, relying on principles of international law to interpret the
constitutional right to life and the guarantee of gender equality to include
protection from sexual harassment and to guarantee the right to work with
dignity.274 Thus, the Indian Supreme Court has issued a detailed sexual
harassment code,275 has held that even temporary workers have the right to
maternity leave,276 and has decided that rape is a violation of the fundamental
right to life which extends to citizens and foreigners alike.277 These decisions
stand in sharp contrast to the role played by the U.S. Supreme Court with
respect to gender violence. The different approaches of the two courts are
explored in the next section.
IV. A COMPARISON OF THE COURTS' ANALYSIS OF CASES
INVOLVING GENDER VIOLENCE
The contrast between the response of the Supreme Courts of the United
States and India to issues of gender equality is nowhere more stark than in
recent cases dealing with gender violence. The two cases that will be
discussed in this section that graphically illustrate the two Courts' profound
273 Id. at 83.
274 See, e.g., Vishaka v. Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 3011 ("Gender equality includes
protection from sexual harassment and the right to work with dignity.").
275 Id.
271 Mun. Corp. of Delhi v. Female Workers, A.I.R. 2000 S.C. 1274, 38.
277 Chairman, Ry. Bd. v. Das, A.I.R. 2000 S.C. 988, 12, 34-37.
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differences are United States v. Morrison,278 where the U.S. Supreme Court
struck down the civil rights remedy in the Violence Against Women Act,279
and Vishaka v. Rajasthan, where the Supreme Court of India established
freedom from violence to be a fundamental constitutional right.280 The U.S.
Supreme Court has, with few exceptions, been loathe to rely on international
law in resolving domestic issues.281  Thus, it is perhaps not surprising that
when confronted with the question of the constitutionality of the Violence
Against Women Act, the Court did not look to the experience of other
countries or to international covenants in considering the nature of the right to
be free from gender motivated violence.282 The Supreme Court of India took
a markedly different path, relying on principles of international law to declare
a right to be free from sexual harassment and rape.283
While the different outcomes in the two cases could be explained by the
different forms of federalism enshrined in the two countries' constitutions, that
explanation only goes so far. To consider Morrison as nothing more than a
reflection of the dictates of the U.S. Constitution's federalism requirements
ignores the gendered aspect of federalism as it is currently conceived by a
majority of the Court.28 4 Judith Resnik convincingly argues that the
state/federal dichotomy reflects gendered assumptions about the appropriate
278 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
279 Id. at 627.
280 A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 3011.
281 Modern jurists... are notably lacking in the diplomatic experience of early
Justices such as John Jay and John Marshall, who were familiar with the law
of nations and felt comfortable navigating by it. Today's jurists, furthermore,
are relatively unfamiliar with interpreting instruments of international
law .... Although the recent decisions of the Supreme Court do not offer
much hope for the immediate future, I look forward to the day when the
Supreme Court, too, will inform its opinions almost all the time with a decent
respect to the opinions of mankind.
Justice Harry A. Blackmun, The Supreme Court and the Law of Nations: Owing a Decent
Respect to the Opinions of Mankind, Address at the 1994 Annual Meeting ofAmerican Society
of International Law, AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. NEWSLETrER, Mar. 1, 6-7 (1994). See Vicki C.
Jackson, Transnational Discourse, Relational Authority, and the US. Court: Gender Equality,
37 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 271 (2003); Judith Resnik, Feminist Justice, At Home and Abroad:
Reconstructing Equality: Of Justice, Justicia, and the Gender of Jurisdiction, 14 YALE J.L. &
FEMInSM 393 (2002).
282 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 598.
283 Vishaka v. Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 3011.
284 See Resnik, supra note 281, at 408; see also Bonita C. Meyersfeld, Reconceptualizing
Domestic Violence in International Law, 67 ALB. L. REv. 371, 420 (2003) (discussing United
States v. Morrison).
2006]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
use of governmental power.285 Issues relating to domestic life are traditionally
relegated to the state whereas issues of commerce are entrusted to the federal
government.28 6 Professor Resnik explains:
[I]n this federation, the jurisdictional divide between state and
federal courts is gender-coded, infused with associations that
identify women with families, define women's legal issues as
problems of families and violence, and locate disputes about such
issues within the jurisdiction of state courts. While some readers
may hesitate before sharing the assumption of jurisdiction as
gendered, most will be comfortable with a parallel claim: that
jurisdictions have hierarchies, and that, in this country, federal
jurisdiction is assumed to be a mark of a matter's import.
Therefore, to refuse to permit something to become a federal case
is to relegate it to a somewhat lesser stature, as about local-as
contrasted with national-legal requirements.287
Professor Resnik relies on a fifty-year history ofjudicial reluctance to establish
federal gender bias task forces and to federalize laws involving the non-
payment of child support, child custody, and violence against women because
gender bias is seen to be a problem only at the state level.288
As is so often the case, how the issue is framed determines how it is to be
resolved.289 The issue before the Court in Morrison could have been whether
violence against women constitutes a denial of the right to equality.290 That
was not, however, the way the Court approached the issue. Instead, the
285 Resnik, supra note 281, at 408.
286 Id.; see also Sally F. Goldfarb, Violence Against Women and the Persistence of Privacy,
61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (2000); Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and
Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117 (1996).
287 Resnik, supra note 281, at 408.
288 Id. at 412-15. While state courts reflect gender bias, "we have confidence that the quality
of the federal bench and the nature of federal law [will] keep such problems to a minimum." Id.
at 413 (citing FED. COURTS STUDY COMM. REPORT (Apr. 2, 1990)).
289 For example, in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), the majority framed the issue as whether homosexuals have a
fundamental constitutional right to engage in sodomy, whereas the dissent viewed the issue as
the right to be let alone.
290 See, e.g., Sally F. Goldfarb, Applying the Discrimination Model to Violence Against
Women: Some Reflections on Theory and Practice, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 251,
262 (2003) (arguing that "violence against women is an expression of gender inequality").
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question presented was whether or not Congress exceeded its power in making
freedom from gender violence a national civil right.29' More specifically, the
issue the Court addressed was whether Congress was properly acting within
its commerce clause power or its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment
when it enacted Section 13981(c) of the Violence Against Women Act of
1994, which created a private cause of action in favor of a victim of gender-
motivated violence.292
The Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) was passed in 1994 after four
years of hearings where Congress heard testimony from physicians, law
professors, rape survivors, victims of domestic abuse, and representatives of
law enforcement agencies and private business.2 93 The record also included
reports on gender bias from twenty-one states plus eight highly detailed reports
from Congress and its committees attesting to the magnitude of the problem
of gender violence. 294 Attorneys General from thirty-eight states supported the
legislation. 295 Although it was only the private civil remedy that was at issue
in Morrison, VAWA also provided federal criminal remedies, provisions for
funding of local domestic violence programs, and interstate enforcement of
orders of protection.296
The statistics regarding gender violence presented to Congress are truly
staggering:
Three out of four American women will be victims of violent
crimes sometime during their life .... Violence is the leading
cause of injuries to women ages 15-44 .... As many as 50
percent of homeless women and children are fleeing domestic
violence .... Since 1974, the assault rate against women has
outstripped the rate for men by at least twice for some age groups
and far more for others .... Battering "is the single largest cause
of injury to women in the United States".... An estimated 4
million American women are battered each year by their
husbands or partners .... Over I million women in the United
States seek medical assistance each year for injuries sustained
[from] their husbands or other partners .... Between 2,000 and
291 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 598.
292 Id. at 601.
293 Id. at 629-30 (Souter, J., dissenting).
294 Id. at 630-31.
295 Id. at 653.
296 Those provisions survive the Court's decision in Morrison. Id. at 613 n.5.
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4,000 women die every year from [domestic] abuse .... Arrest
rates may be as low as 1 for every 100 domestic assaults ....
Partial estimates show that violent crime against women costs
this country at least 3 billion-not million, but billion--dollars
a year .... Estimates suggest that we spend $5 to $10 billion a
year on health care, criminal justice, and other social costs of
domestic violence.297
Congress was presented with similarly horrifying findings about the
incidence of rape:
[The incidence of] rape rose four times as fast as the total
national crime rate over the past 10 years .... According to one
study, close to half a million girls now in high school will be
raped before they graduate . . . . [One hundred twenty-five
thousand] college women can expect to be raped during this-or
any-year .... Three-quarters of women never go to the movies
alone after dark because of the fear of rape and nearly 50 percent
do not use public transit alone after dark for the same reason ....
[Forty-one] percent of judges surveyed believed that juries give
sexual assault victims less credibility than other crime
victims .... Less than 1 percent of all [rape] victims have
collected damages .... [A]n individual who commits rape has
only about 4 chances in 100 of being arrested, prosecuted, and
found guilty of any offense .... Almost one-quarter of convicted
rapists never go to prison and another quarter received sentences
in local jails where the average sentence is 11 months ....
Almost 50 percent of rape victims lose theirjobs or are forced to
quit because of the crime's severity.298
This "mountain of data' 299 convinced Congress that gender violence was
far more than a collection of individual wrongs and simply a local problem;
that it was a widespread "practice of social inequality carried out on an
individual level."3 ' Yet the Court refused to embrace the paradigm that had
297 Id. at 631-32.
291 Id. at 633-34.
299 Id. at 628.
" Goldfarb, supra note 290, at 254.
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been used to combat race discrimination, finding instead that Congress lacked
the power to convert a local problem into a federal one.3'
The Supreme Court of India presents a stark contrast. As noted earlier, the
Court has embraced international law to support its finding that women have
a constitutional right to be free from sexual harassment and that rape
constitutes a violation of the fundamental right to life.30 2 While the U.S.
Supreme Court, under the rubric of a federalism analysis, refused to recognize
the link between gender violence and pervasive inequality, the Indian Supreme
Court views violence against women in its larger context as an extreme form
of gender inequality and as contributing to women's disempowerment.
The Court's activism in this area has been fueled largely by the women's
movement, which has played a major role in the Court's jurisprudence and
which was galvanized by the Court's failure to do justice in a case involving
the rape of a young woman by police officers.3 3 The catalyst for change took
the form of a case involving the rape of a sixteen-year-old "tribal girl" by two
policemen in the police station. The lower court acquitted the officers on the
ground that the victim was "habituated to sexual intercourse" having eloped
with her boyfriend, and thus could not be raped."° The High Court reversed,
finding that helpless surrender by threats or fear cannot be considered
consent.3"5 In Tuka Ram v. Maharashtra,"6 known as the Mathura case, the
30, Relying on United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), the Court held that Congress had
exceeded its power under the commerce clause because gender violence was local, non-economic
activity, and because VAWA contained no jurisdictional element. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627.
The Court also rejected Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as an alternative source of
congressional power, because the Fourteenth Amendment does not reach private conduct and
because the legislation lacked congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented
or remedied and the means adopted to that end. Id. at 625-26.
302 See, e.g., Vishaka v. Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 3011 ("Gender equality includes
protection from sexual harassment and [the] right to work with dignity .... ); Apparel Export
Promotion Council v. Chopra, (1999) 1 S.C.C. 759, 25 (holding that sexual harassment in the
workplace results in a violation of the fundamental right to gender equality and the right to life
and liberty); Chairman, Ry. Bd. v. Das, A.I.R. 2000 S.C. 988 (holding that rape is a violation of
the fundamental right to life).
303 Tuka Ram v. Maharashtra, (1979) 1 S.C.R. 810.
304 Id. 13.
305 Mere passive or helpless surrender of the body and its resignation to the
other's lust induced by threats or fear cannot be equated with the desire or
will, nor can [it] furnish an answer by the mere fact that the sexual act was not
in opposition to such desire or volition.... On t he [sic] other hand, taking
advantage of the fact that Mathura was involved in a complaint filed by her
brother and that she was alone at the police station at the dead hour of night,
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Indian Supreme Court reversed the conviction on the ground that the victim
must have been lying since she bore no visible scars.3"7 The decision served
to energize the women's movement, which effectively campaigned for change
in the courts' treatment of rape cases.308
The Indian Supreme Court responded. In 1995, the Court held that
corroboration cannot be required in a rape case.30 9 In the same year, in a case
involving the rape of four "helpless tribal women" on a train followed by
rough and humiliating treatment by the police and further trauma inflicted by
the criminal prosecution, the Court directed the National Commission for
Women to develop a mechanism for providing rehabilitation and compensation
to rape victims "to wipe out the tears of such unfortunate victims. '310  The
Court mandated legal representation for rape victims, anonymity of rape
victims, and compensation.3 1I
One of the most remarkable examples of the Court's activism, and the case
that stands in sharp contrast to the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Morrison
is Vishaka v. Rajasthan."2 Vishaka was a class action brought by social
activists and NGOs in response to the gang rape of a social worker in
Rajasthan. Since sexual violence is a recurring phenomenon, and since the
legislature had not acted, the Court concluded that it must design rules to
it is more probable that the initiative for satisfying the sexual desire must have
proceeded from the accused, and that victim Mathura must not have been a
willing party to the act of the sexual intercourse.
Id. 4 (citing the High Court).
306 Id.
307 Id. 5.
301 Jaising, supra note 16, at 304 (discussing the aftermath of the Mathura decision).
309 Singh v. Madhya Pradesh, A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 2472.
In State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain this Court
speaking through one of us (Ahmadi, J.) had occasion to point out that a
woman who is a victim of sexual assault is not an accomplice to the crime but
is a victim of another person's lust and therefore her evidence need not be
tested with the same amount of suspicion as that of an accomplice. She is not
in the category of a child witness or an accomplice and therefore the rule of
prudence that her evidence must be corroborated in material particulars has
no application, at the most the court may look for some evidence which lends
assurance.
Id. 7.
310 Delhi Domestic Working Women's Forum v. Union of India, (1995) 1 S.C.J. 94, 18.
311 Id. 15.
312 A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 3011.
[Vol. 34:557
WOMEN AND LAW
combat sexual harassment.313 In interpreting the fundamental rights contained
in the Indian Constitution, the Court looked to international law, concluding
that "[a]ny International Convention not inconsistent with the fundamental
rights and in harmony with its spirit must be read into these provisions to
enlarge the meaning and content thereof, to promote the object of the
constitutional guarantee."314  Thus, in India, gender equality should be
interpreted according to international conventions and norms in the absence of
any domestic law occupying the field.
The Court in Vishaka pointed to key provisions of the Convention for the
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW),1 5 and
concluded that "[g]ender equality includes protection from sexual harassment
and the right to work with dignity." '3 16 Having reached this legal conclusion,
the Court proceeded to draft a detailed sexual harassment code and impose a
duty on employers, seemingly public and private, to prevent sexual harassment
and to provide a grievance procedure for employees.3" 7
Another remarkable case dealing with sexual harassment is Apparel Export
Promotion Council v. Chopra,318 involving a complaint of harassment of an
employee by a supervisor. The supervisor allegedly tried to sit very close to
the employee and touch her and tried to molest her in the elevator, causing her
to hit the emergency switch.319 The Enquiry Officer removed the supervisor
from his position, finding that he "had acted against moral sanctions and that
his ...acts against Miss X did not withstand the test of decency and
modesty."32 The supervisor successfully challenged his removal in the High
Court of Delhi, which concluded that the supervisor merely attempted a
molestation which did not warrant his removal, although back pay was
denied.32' The Division Bench agreed.322
313 "In the absence of legislative measures, the need is to find an effective alternative
mechanism to fulfil this felt and urgent social need." Id.
314 Id.
315 CEDAW, supra note 5. India signed CEDAW on July 30, 1980. U.N. Division for the
Advancement of Women, Parties to CEDAW, http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/
states.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2006).
316 Vishaka v. Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 3011.
317 Id. In Medha Kotwal Lele v. U. 0., No. 173-177/1999 (2004), twelve states were fined
10,000 rupees each for non-implementation of the Court's guidelines in Vishaka.
318 A.I.R. 1999 S.C. 625.
319 Id. 3.
320 Id.
321 In the totality of facts and circumstances, ends ofjustice would be met if the
petitioner is reinstated in service but he would not be entitled to any back
2006]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
The Indian Supreme Court reversed, restoring the order of removal and
finding error in the use of a formalistic approach to the meaning of
"molestation." '323 Citing Vishaka, the Court held that sexual harassment
encompasses unwelcome sexual advances and verbal or physical conduct with
sexual overtones creating a hostile environment.324 Relying on international
instruments, the Court found that sexual harassment in the workplace results
in a violation of the fundamental right to gender equality and the right to life
and liberty.325 In other words, sexual harassment is a constitutional wrong.
Another case where the Court treated gender violence as a constitutional
wrong is Chairman, Railway Board v. Das.326 This writ was filed in the
Calcutta High Court by a public interest lawyer, referred to as a "[priest] in the
temple of justice," '327 on behalf of a Bangladeshi woman who was gang raped
by employees of the railroad and then raped again by her rescuer. The High
Court ordered the railway to pay 100,000 rupees as compensation.328 The
railway appealed, arguing that the victim was a foreigner and therefore not
entitled to constitutional protection, that the incident was only an individual
offense, and that the railway should not be vicariously liable.329
With respect to the claim that the victim was not a citizen, the Court noted
that some of the fundamental rights, such as Articles 15, 16 and 19, refer to
"citizens," while others, such as Article 14, refer to "persons. 330 Despite this,
the Court concluded that "life" as used in Article 21 must be interpreted in a
manner consistent with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and in a
manner consistent with previous interpretations by the Court.331  Thus, the
Court held that the protections of Article 21 extend beyond citizens to any
wages. The Council shall consider this period as on duty and would give him
consequential promotion to the petitioner. He shall be entitled to all benefits
except back wages. The petitioner shall be posted in any other office outside
Delhi, at least for a period of two years.
Id. 13.
322 The Division Bench "also concluded that since the respondent had not actually molested
Miss X and had only tried to assault her and had 'not managed' to make any physical contact
with her, a case of his removal from service was not made out." Id. 14.
323 Id. 7 22.
324 Id. 723.
325 Id. 25.
326 A.I.R. 2000 S.C. 988.
327 Id. 16.
328 Id. 4.
329 Id. 7 19, 38.
330 Id. 28.
331 Id. 32.
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persons and the right to life includes the right to live with human dignity.
Since rape is a violation of the fundamental right to life under Article 21, the
victim is entitled to compensation.332
A recent decision by the High Court of Rajasthan, Suo Moto v.
Rajasthan,333 graphically illustrates the efforts of the Indian judiciary to
address the failure of the criminal justice system to adequately respond to the
increased prevalence of violence against women. A justice of the High Court
of Rajasthan read a newspaper article on May 12, 2005 reporting that a
German tourist had been raped the previous night by a rickshaw driver and an
accomplice. 334 The following day, the judge, acting suo moto,335 invoked the
jurisdiction of the High Court over fundamental rights and entered an interim
order directing the police to conduct and complete an investigation within
three days; the criminal court judge to ensure that, if a charge were filed, the
trial would be completed within one month; the superintendent of police to
ensure the safety of the victim; and the State of Rajasthan to pay the victim's
lodging and boarding expenses for the period necessitated by the investigation
and trial.336
As a result of this order, the investigation was completed and the charge
sheet filed against the two alleged perpetrators within thirty-six hours, and the
trial was concluded within twenty days, a time frame unprecedented in India.337
The prosecution called twenty-one witnesses, including the villagers who had
responded to the victim's screams for help. The defendants were represented
by attorneys who attempted to adjourn the case to obtain information about the
victim's character, which was denied based on prohibitions on inquiring about
a victim's character.38  The defendants were found guilty of rape and
sentenced to life imprisonment.339
332 Id. 36-37.
... D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2856/2005, June 2005 (decision on file with author)
[hereinafter Writ Petition].
334 Id. 1.
331 "Suo moto" refers to the power of a judge of the High Court to institute the action on his
or her own, without the aggrieved party's involvement. See Gautam v. Chakraborty, A.I.R. 1996
S.C. 922.
336 Writ Petition, supra note 333, 4.
337 Id. 5.
338 The Indian Evidence Act was amended in 2003 to provide that "in a prosecution for rape
or [an] attempt to commit rape, it shall not be permissible to put questions in the cross-
examination of the prosecutrix as to her general immoral character." Indian Evidence
(Amendment) Act, No. 4 of 2003, INDIA CODE (2003).
339 Writ Petition, supra note 333, 6.
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Relying on principles of international law, the High Court used this case as
a "catalyst" to reform the criminal courts' treatment of cases involving sexual
violence. In addition to ordering the State of Rajasthan to pay 300,000 rupees
to the victim, 340 the Court ordered the State to set up a special cell to ensure
prompt investigation and trial of all charges of sexual violence; to provide
financial, medical, psychological and social assistance to all victims; and to
organize sensitivity training for judges and police officers.34' Although local
editorials highlighted the fact that this order was precipitated by an attack on
a tourist and motivated by a concern about its effect on the tourism industry,
the breadth of the order, if implemented, may reform the response of the
criminal justice system to all sexual violence cases.
V. CONCLUSION: EVALUATION OF THE COURTS' APPLICATION OF
EQUALITY PRINCIPLES
To what extent do the competing theories of equality reflect and adequately
address different cultural conditions within the two countries? Has either
Court played a meaningful role in advancing the guarantee of equality for its
nation's women?
In the United States, the Court's rigid adherence to formal equality theory
has worked to undo the protectionism of the past and the patriarchy underlying
that paternalism. Formal equality theory, however, goes only so far, providing
equality to women only within a sphere of activity occupied by men.
Stephanie Wildman refers to this as the comparison model of equal protection
analysis.342 In order for women to state an equal protection claim, there must
be a point of comparison; men and women must have been treated differently.
By requiring the comparison, the approach fails to address experiences not
shared by men, most notably pregnancy and sexual violence.3 43 A formal
equality model necessarily proceeds from an assumption of a male norm.3"4
3 Three hundred thousand rupees is approximately $7,150.
34, The order directs that investigations must be completed within one week and trials must
be completed within four months. Id. 45.
342 Wildman, Vision and Revision, supra note 130, at 712-13; see also Wildman,
Legitimation, supra note 130.
313 See Kay, supra note 130, at 1 (advocating equality of opportunity rather than formal
equality).
3" See Becker, supra note 130, at 36 (noting that formal equality gives women only the right
to what men are entitled to "under the rules and requirements worked out by and for men... ").
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Geduldig v. Aiello,345 discussed earlier, illustrates the problem. The U.S.
Supreme Court found that California's disability insurance program, which
excluded pregnancy-related disabilities, did not violate equal protection
because men were not receiving anything that women were not.346 That
approach, however, fails to account for the consequences that women may
experience in the workplace that are related to pregnancy. In fact, the dissent
in Geduldig noted that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission had
found that women were experiencing "systematic and pervasive
discrimination" in employment opportunities and benefits solely on the basis
of their childrearing role.347
Geduldig demonstrates the two deficiencies of the formal equality model
as utilized by the U.S. Supreme Court in addressing gender inequities. First,
it reflects a male normed view of equality: "There is no risk from which men
are protected and women are not. Likewise, there is no risk from which
women are protected and men are not." '348 Since men cannot become pregnant,
women are not being denied anything that men get. Secondly, it completely
ignores the radically different effects that seemingly gender-neutral laws can
have on men and women, effects that often reflect the responsibilities that
women continue to shoulder relating to child care and housework.349
If the goal of equality is full citizenship stature, or, in Justice Ginsburg's
words, "[the] equal opportunity to aspire, achieve, participate in and contribute
to society based on ... individual talents and capacities,"3 ' then surely the
rigidity of formal equality must yield to a more substantive model. A model
of substantive equality would be less concerned with insuring identical
treatment, and more concerned with whether laws or policies serve to
perpetuate or reinforce historic patterns of subordination. Under this approach,
differences would be recognized and taken into account, not as a form of
14' 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
346 Id. at 496-97.
341 Id. at 502 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
348 Id. at 496-97.
349 See generally SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER AND THE FAMILY 134-69 (1989);
Suzanne M. Bianchi et al., Is Anyone Doing the Housework? Trends in the Gender Division of
Household Labor, 79 SOC. FORCES 191 (2000); Scott Coltrane, Research on HouseholdLabor:
Modeling and Measuring the Social Embeddedness ofRoutine Family Work, 62 J. MARRIAGE
& FAM. 1208 (2000).
3.0 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532 (1996).
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protectionism, but with the goal of eliminating the unequal consequences of
sex differences, whether biologically or culturally determined."'
In India, the Supreme Court's treatment of equality claims is more multi-
layered, reflecting the Constitution's commitment to the use of protective
discrimination to achieve the goal of equality. Formal equality theory has been
employed to uphold classifications based on real or socially constructed
differences between men and women. Many of these cases represent simple
protectionism, revealing underlying patriarchal norms used to exclude women
from the workplace and from civic responsibility. These cases serve to
perpetuate the stereotype of women as weak,352 as destined for marriage and
motherhood,353 and as passive with respect to sexual activity. 354 Although
Article 15(3)'s authorization of laws designed to benefit women holds the
promise of a substantive form of equality, it has at times been used to reinforce
sexual stereotypes in a way likely to impede women's full participation in
society.
The Indian Supreme Court's interpretation of the constitutional proscription
of discrimination on the basis of sex only has also served to perpetuate sexual
stereotypes. As Supreme Court advocate Indira Jaising has noted, this
interpretation "has enabled courts to segregate sex from gender and uphold
blatantly discriminatory legislation. '355 The Air India case, discussed earlier,
is among the most graphic examples of this myopia.356
However, alongside this series of cases illustrating protectionism in the
service of perpetuating subordination, the Court has also utilized protectionism
to overcome subordination. The Court has repeatedly and effectively relied on
Article 15(3) and on international covenants to address pervasive
disadvantages suffered by women, as in the Court's interpretation of personal
laws and, most notably, in the Court's jurisprudence regarding violence
directed at women.357 While these cases could be viewed as protectionist, they
351 For articles advocating different versions of substantive equality theory, see supra note
130.
352 See, e.g., Mahsi v. Union of India, (1995) 1 S.C.J. 90.
353 See, e.g., Air India v. Meerza, (1982) 1 S.C.R. 438.
311 See, e.g., Vishnu v. Union of India, (1985) 1 S.C.R. 741; see also supra note 226 and
accompanying text; Jaising, supra note 16, at 295 (referring to the Indian Supreme Court's
reliance on Article 15(3) as justifying the "regulation of female sexuality based on the weaker
sex approach to gender issues").
... Jaising, supra note 16, at 294.
356 See supra notes 240-46 and accompanying text.
351 See supra notes 302-41 and accompanying text.
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do not serve to perpetuate stereotypes that have historically served to
perpetuate power disparities. Rather, these cases reflect the Court's
willingness to treat gender violence as a breach of society's commitment to
equality. The Indian Supreme Court has recognized what the U.S. Supreme
Court failed to acknowledge in Morrison, that violence against women
operates to prevent women from operating as full and equal participants in
society."'
Further, drawing on constitutional provisions that authorize and embody
substantive equality theory, the Supreme Court of India has consistently upheld
reservations for women in legislative bodies, municipal corporations, and
public employment.359 These cases signify the Court's recognition that
compensating for discrimination is not an exception to equality but a means of
achieving equality.36°
Ultimately, the roles of the Supreme Courts of India and the United States
reflect the differences between the two constitutional regimes. Although both
constitutions make equality a core value and prohibit the State from denying
equal protection of the laws, the Indian Constitution also contains a positive
grant of power to the government to take steps to eliminate inequality. This
mandate is not found in the U.S. Constitution, and the U.S. Supreme Court has
not interpreted the equality guarantee to confer any positive rights. Instead, the
U.S. Supreme Court has adhered to formal equality theory, initially to rely on
women's weak physical structure and maternal function to uphold gender
classifications and, more recently, to deny the existence of gender differences
to strike down sex classifications.36" ' The Indian Supreme Court has issued a
comparable set of formal equality decisions, although it has not meaningfully
moved beyond the protectionist stage. However, the Indian Supreme Court,
relying on constitutional provisions and international covenants, has been
willing to deviate from its adherence to formal equality theory. The Court has
recognized that formal equality can stand in the way of true equality and, at
least with respect to interpreting personal laws, upholding reservations for
women, and seeking to insure women's freedom from sexual violence, has
... See supra note 302.
... In addition to Article 15(3), which authorizes special provisions for women, and Article
243D which authorizes reservations for women on panchayats, India's Constitution explicitly
authorizes reservations for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, and other backward classes. See
supra note 148.
360 See, e.g., Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, (1992) 3 S.C.C. 212.
361 See supra notes 31-144 and accompanying text.
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adopted a jurisprudence willing to acknowledge and compensate for
disadvantage.362
So long as society remains riddled with power disparities between men and
women, and so long as patriarchy remains deeply embedded in the culture,
formal equality theory will fail to achieve gender justice. The goal of an
egalitarian society will only be achieved when the courts employ a more result-
oriented methodology-a methodology reflected in the Supreme Court of
India's recognition that the equality imperative does not merely enjoin
discriminatory state conduct but also requires positive protection and
corrective action by the state.
362 See supra notes 164-223, 271-77, 302-32 and accompanying text.
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